



Real-Time Response Review of the 2018 Indonesia Tsunami Appeal Disasters Emergency Committee and Swiss Solidarity



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Final Report

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
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Acronyms

AAP	Accountability to Affected Populations
AHA	ASEAN Coordinating System for Humanitarian Assistance on Disasters
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
BPBD	Regional/Provincial/District Disaster Management Agency
BNPB	National Disaster Management Agency
BKMG	Indonesian Agency for Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics
CBA	Cash-based Assistance
CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund (UN)
CHF	Swiss Francs
CHS	Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee (UK)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DG ECHO	Directorate General, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EOPs	Emergency Operations Centre (PUSDALOPS)
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
Gol	Government of Indonesia
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HFI	Humanitarian Forum Indonesia
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IDPs	Internally Displaced Person(s)
IDR	Indonesian Rupees (US\$1=IDR 13,900 approx.)
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MOP	Ministry of Planning (BAPPENAS at national level, BAPPEDA at provincial/district)
MoPWH	Ministry of Public Works and Housing

MoSA	Ministry of Social Affairs (KEMENSOS) (also called DEPSOS and DinSOS)
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
PDAM	Indonesian Regional and Local Water Management Company
PMI	Indonesian Red Cross
PWD	Person with Disability
PSEA	Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
RTR	Real-Time Response Review
SEKDA	Regional Secretary
SwS	Swiss Solidarity
TOR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WHO	World Health Organisation

Maps



Executive Summary

The review: The Real Time Response Review (the review) was commissioned jointly by the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) and Swiss Solidarity (SwS) to learn lessons from Phase I of the Indonesia Tsunami response in Central Sulawesi that could be applied in real-time to the planning for Phase II. By design, the review was quick and light touch exercise that relied largely on qualitative inputs. The review adopted a mixed methods approach, combining interviews (the majority conducted in and around Palu), document review, an online survey, site visits and focus group discussions. The review team¹ visited Palu January 15-24, 2019, hosted by Save the Children Indonesia.

Background: On September 28, 2018, several earthquakes struck Central Sulawesi in Indonesia, with the strongest having a magnitude of 7.4 on the Richter Scale. The earthquake was followed by a tsunami that took the authorities by surprise. More than 2,000 people are known to have died, with more than 1,350 missing and, as of late November 2018, over 130,000 people were displaced. Both the DEC and SwS launched their appeals quickly and raised GBP25.4 million and CHF13.6 million, respectively, by the end of January 2019, with funds to be spent via national affiliates and local partners in Central Sulawesi.

Operating Context: The operating context for the response was challenging, especially during the first weeks after the disaster. The figures for the numbers of people affected and displaced were unclear at the outset. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Palu lacked sufficient capacity to deal with a disaster of this scale, as did government authorities, which were themselves impacted by the disaster. The Government of Indonesia (the Government) established coordination structures in line with the national disaster management legislation and took a strong lead in the response. The projects funded by DEC and SwS had to be implemented by national affiliates and local partners, as the presence of International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and expatriate staff in and around Palu was not permitted. Further challenges in the operating environment have included:

- Reliable disaggregated assessment and output data has been hard to obtain;
- Sector coordination was somewhat chaotic in the early weeks but has improved since;
- Obtaining sufficient supplies was and remains difficult because of a lack of major suppliers in Palu;
- Support to transitional shelter construction was largely held back until the end of January by Government indecision on the levels of multi-purpose cash grants (since decided);
- Unresolved issues regarding land, zoning and relocation plans are having a negative impact on the most severely affected, who have lost both property and access to land;
- Water trucking is very costly but for some locations there is no obvious alternative in the short term. Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) and waste management remain major issues in camps and municipal areas;
- NGOs need to decide whether to help the Government to implement its somewhat controversial programme for the provision of 'long-house' multi-household shelters.

Good practices: DEC/SwS organisations have demonstrated good practices in several ways:

- Harnessing Indonesian staff capacity from within the country and internationally;
- Playing an active part in government-led coordination processes and providing co-leadership;
- Widely promoting the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) and the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA);
- Undertaking joint assessments, for example a joint needs assessment, a joint market assessment and others;
- Practising in-depth engagement with affected communities, including the use of feedback and complaints mechanisms;
- Information sharing between organisations to avoid overlaps;
- Bringing attention to the needs of vulnerable groups;
- Achieving efficiencies through the use of information and other technologies;
- Showing a clear commitment to localisation and local capacity development.

¹ The review team was composed of: Simon Lawry-White (team leader), Brenda Langdon (international consultant), and Umi Hanik (national consultant)

Meeting humanitarian needs: In spite of various challenges and delays, DEC/SwS organisations made a significant contribution to the response. Provincial government officials expressed their appreciation to the review team for the role played by NGOs in the response. The speed of response of DEC/SwS organisations varied considerably from 2-3 days to 2-3 months to start implementation. Organisations have made considerable efforts to identify the most vulnerable in communities affected, in some cases against the resistance of the Government and communities themselves.

Shortcomings in the response: Overall, the response was relatively slow and did not reach all those needing assistance. Tens of thousands are still displaced. Many have lost their livelihoods from farming, fishing, small business and industry, all of which were severely impacted by the disaster. Cash transfers that could have had a major positive impact in re-establishing livelihoods were largely delayed until the end of January when several DEC/SwS organisations have implemented multipurpose cash grants linked to levels of damage to housing.

Agencies recognise the need to scale up their support to livelihoods but there were few concrete proposals on restoring long-term livelihoods at the time of the review visit, including from the Government. DEC/SwS organisations were relatively satisfied with their progress in Phase I but are also clear that there are gaps in the response and are concerned that they may not have sufficient financial resources to cover the significant outstanding humanitarian needs.

Humanitarian Principles: At Jakarta and Headquarters (HQ) level, DEC and SwS organisations did not intervene to influence the Indonesian government to address the shortcomings in the response, nor were they requested to do so by colleagues in Palu. For the most part, DEC/SwS organisations do not seem to have advocated strongly for unmet humanitarian needs to be addressed.

Standards: DEC/SwS organisations have been working to achieve the Sphere standards, which are used within the provincial clusters and working groups. DEC/SwS organisations have shown strong commitment to the CHS by engaging affected people in decision-making and implementing feedback and complaints mechanisms. Less progress has been made on the CHS commitment to complementarity and they need to work together more closely for maximum effect.

Protection: As often in humanitarian response, initial attention has been focused on physical outputs (tents erected, kits delivered, water supplied, etc.). Phase II provides an opportunity to go deeper into protection/vulnerability issues. Collectively, the organisations could be doing more to address challenges faced by women and girls, including gender-based violence (GBV). There is a consensus that the protection of vulnerable groups needs further attention in Phase II.

Partnerships and Localisation: The organisations are developing their own and partner capacity through local staff recruitment, short training courses, and on the ground accompaniment and 'learning by doing'. At least one organisation is undertaking capacity development of local capacity developers. There is a strong commitment to greater localisation.

Lessons: There are important lessons for the DEC/SwS organisations from Phase 1 of the Indonesia tsunami response both for Phase II and for future responses, including:

- Having a national NGO affiliate allowed for faster mobilisation relative to those needing to form new partnerships with local NGOs;
- The capacity to utilise appeal funds has been restricted by the limited number of NGOs with sufficient capacity to absorb and spend funds effectively, and may continue to be;
- The organisations need to consider how to stop protection and vulnerability issues being marginalised by a concentration on restoring physical infrastructure;
- While there has been relatively little competition between NGOs during the response, DEC/SwS organisations have the opportunity to consider how they could maximise their contribution by working collectively to support the response led by local government, in this disaster and in the future.
- The Government's close management of the response has limited the scope and speed of the response of both national and international NGOs. DEC/SwS organisations could usefully reflect on how they can make the strongest contribution to disaster management in South

East Asia, where the policy environment for disaster response may be similar to that experienced in Sulawesi.

Recommendations: The review recommendations for Phase II of the response are detailed in Section 7 of the report.

Recommendations on how to approach Phase II:

1. Anticipate the emerging operating context, including the continued limited capacity of local partners, evolving government requirements for NGOs, outstanding decisions on land zoning and relocation, and the risks that may arise from the national elections in April 2019;
2. Coordinate capacity and resources to maximise, together, their support to provincial and district authorities, through combined offers of financial resources and technical expertise to the affected districts;
3. In pursuit of localisation, combine DEC/SwS organisations' capacity development for local NGOs and support to government authorities.

Recommendations on priority actions in Phase II:

4. Accelerate support for the construction of transitional shelters needed by households affected by the disaster but not provided for by government, and determine whether and how to support government-built communal shelters;
5. Revise WASH interventions to provide medium-term solutions, moving away from water trucking and mobile toilet units as soon as feasible;
6. Implement cash transfers at scale as soon as possible to maximise their potential for widespread positive impact for large numbers of affected people;
7. Initiate, or expand, livelihoods support projects to increase the household income of people affected by the disaster;
8. Scale up basic social services, to which many affected people do not have access, and mainstream protection into all sectors;
9. Pursue disaster risk reduction projects that will reduce loss of life and damage from future disasters.

1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose and Objectives of the Real Time Review

The Real Time Response Review was commissioned jointly by the Disaster Emergency Committee (DEC) and Swiss Solidarity (SwS). According to the Terms of Reference (TOR), the primary purpose of the Real Time Review (the review) was to:

- “Instigate and promote learning from the initial phase of the response across the DEC members and SwS partners, in order that lessons be applied in real-time, and integrated into Phase II plans.”

The review covers the activities of 13 DEC members and 8 SwS partners² responding to the disaster using funds from the DEC and SwS 2018 Indonesia Tsunami Appeal.

The objectives of the review were to:

- Learn lessons at operational level to use in design/implementation of Phase II;
- Highlight good practice;
- Identify gaps, areas of unmet need and challenges (sector-specific and cross-cutting).

The TOR specified three areas of enquiry for the review:

- Focus area 1: How DEC members and SwS partners are addressing the needs of the most vulnerable groups.
- Focus area 2: How DEC members and SwS partners ensure accountability to affected populations through the application of the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) and related guidelines on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA).
- Focus area 3: How DEC members and SwS partners are working with and through local partners and engaging with national authorities in this response.

The focus areas are not addressed separately but are woven into the 13 review questions addressed in Section 6 of the report.

The review team was led by Simon Lawry-White, with team members Brenda Langdon, international consultant and Umi Hanik, national consultant. The review team would like to record its thanks to Save the Children Indonesia (YSTC), which provided excellent hosting and support to the review team before and during the team visit to Sulawesi.

The TOR for the review is included as Annex 12.

Note: Rather than referring to DEC member and SwS partners repetitively, the report uses ‘DEC/SwS organisations’ or just ‘the organisations’. Similarly, Real Time Response Review becomes “the RTR” or ‘the review’. The PMI (Indonesian Red Cross), the IFRC and national Red Cross Red Crescent societies are not NGOs. However, ‘INGOs’ is used as a general term in place of ‘INGOs and the Red Cross Red Crescent’.

1.2 Methodology

The review followed a mixed-methods approach to generate lessons and recommendations for practical application by DEC members and SwS partners responding to the remainder of Phase I and planning for Phase II of the response.

1.2.1 Inception Report

During the inception phase, the review team drew on a preliminary document review, discussions with the DEC and SwS secretariats, and inputs to an inception workshop³ from DEC/SwS organisations, including representatives in Palu, Indonesia. Based on these sources, thirteen review

² **DEC Members are:** Action Against Hunger, ActionAid UK, Age International, British Red Cross, CAFOD, CARE International UK, Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide UK, Islamic Relief Worldwide, Oxfam GB, Plan International UK, Save the Children UK, Tearfund and World Vision UK.

Swiss Solidarity partners include: ADRA Switzerland; Caritas Suisse; Swiss Red Cross; Medair; Save the Children Switzerland; Solidar Switzerland; Swiss Church Aid EPER/HEKS; CBM Christoffel Blindenmission Switzerland.

³ Held at the DEC offices in London on December 14th, 2018.

questions were prioritised and agreed in the inception report. The review questions are addressed in Section 5 of this report.

1.2.2 Key Informant Interviews

Semi-structured interviews were undertaken with the following stakeholder groups:

- Secretariats of the DEC and SwS, during the inception phase;
- Management and programme staff of DEC and SwS organisations in Sulawesi, and partners, in Palu city, and during site visits to the districts of Palu, Donggala, and Sigi;
- Management and programme staff of operational partners;
- Provincial and district officials in Palu;
- UN agencies in Palu and Jakarta;
- DFID monitoring mission in Palu, DG ECHO regional humanitarian adviser Bangkok.

15 of the 21 organisations were interviewed, plus 3 government offices, 6 operational partners, 2 UN agencies, 2 donors, and 1 non-DEC/SwS NGO, which given the time available, was an adequate sample. A full list of interviewees is included as Annex 1, and the key informant interview questions used with different stakeholder groups are included in Annex 10.

1.2.3 Document Review

The review team reviewed primary and secondary qualitative and quantitative data and documentation. The DEC and SwS secretariats provided a wide range of documentation via a shared Dropbox folder, which was supplemented by the review team as further relevant documents were located on the Internet and provided by key informants. A bibliography is included as Annex 2.

1.2.4 Online Survey

A total of 36 completed survey responses were received.⁴ This may not be a representative sample but at least one completed response was received from 18 of the 21 organisations.⁵ The primary aim of the survey was to give staff of the organisations not interviewed by the review team a chance to provide input. This was realised, with 24 of 36 responses coming from staff based at country office, regional and Headquarters (HQ) levels. The online survey added important self-assessment and additional commentary from the organisations. A summary report of the survey results is included as Annex 9.

1.2.5 Country visit

The review team visited central Sulawesi from January 15-24, 2019. Before the review visit, it was reported that partners and communities were already becoming weary of the multiple assessment, review, and evaluation exercises. However, we found both organisations and communities very keen to engage with the review. In addition to the key informant interviews discussed above, the country visit comprised:

- **In-country briefing workshop.** This half-day briefing workshop held on January 16 was very well attended. The workshop clarified the objectives of the review and the process for the interviews and site visits. The schedule and logistical arrangements were confirmed during the workshop, and further updated during the course of the visit;
- **Site visits:** Visits to projects sites were undertaken according to a schedule proposed by the review team before its arrival in Sulawesi and amended with the organisations concerned during the visit. Six site visits were made within Palu, Donggala and Sigi districts, with the aim of covering a range of organisations and the sectors receiving most DEC/SwS funding. The review team is grateful to all the organisations which facilitated the site visits;
- **In-country learning workshop.** A half-day learning workshop was held in Palu on January 23, at the end of the country visit. The review team presented its initial findings on the operating context, good practices, lessons, and challenges from the response to date, on

⁴ A further ten blank responses were received and removed from the data set.

⁵ The exception being Christian Aid, Save the Children Switzerland, and World Vision UK.

which participants provided useful commentary. The notes from the learning workshop are included as Annex 8.

Annex 1 lists all the workshop participants, interviews and site visits undertaken.

1.2.6 Review Limitations

The review visit was subject to a series of limitations, which may provide important learning for how future real time response reviews are planned and conducted. Review limitations included:

- Making generalisations across the response of 21 DEC and SwS organisations has been challenging because their responses differ widely in scale, speed and type of response;
- It was not possible to interact meaningfully with all the organisations concerned or to observe all types of interventions funded by DEC/SwS (for example, health projects). In mitigation, almost all the organisations attended the learning workshop and responded to the online survey;
- Six site visits allowed the review team to hear directly from members of affected communities. Focus group discussions (FGDs) were not always successful because discussion with small groups without the presence of partner and national affiliate staff members and of village leaders did not prove possible;
- The Post Disaster Needs Assessment conducted by the UN and the Master Plan for Recovery and Reconstruction by the Ministry of Planning had not been released at the time of the review;
- During the period of the review, organisations were undertaking their own reviews and evaluations but, in practice, these were not completed in time to be referenced by the review.

2 Situation Overview

At dusk on September 28, 2018, several earthquakes struck Central Sulawesi in Indonesia, with the strongest at a depth of 10km and a magnitude of 7.4 on the Richter Scale and with its epicentre in Donggala Regency, 77 km from the provincial capital of Palu.⁶ The subsequent tsunami took the authorities by surprise.⁷ As Palu lies at the end of a narrow bay, the tsunami's force was thought to have been concentrated as it entered the bay. The tsunami reached a maximum of 4-7 metres in height, striking the coastal settlements of Palu, Donggala and Mamuju along its path. Hundreds attending the Nomoni Festival on Talise Beach in Palu were swept away. More than 2,000 people are known to have died, more than 1,350 more are missing, and over 130,000 were recorded as displaced, as of late November.⁸

In effect, the disaster in Central Sulawesi is of three types, each with different impacts: 1) the earthquake, 2) the tsunami and 3) liquefaction. The earthquake caused major soil liquefaction in parts of Palu and Sigi districts. Many buildings were submerged, causing hundreds of deaths with many more missing. The damage in the urban areas of Palu differs from the damage in more rural districts.

⁶ The strongest shaking was felt in Donggala Regency with a maximum intensity of IX (violent) on the Mercalli Intensity Scale, compared to VII (very strong) in Palu.

⁷ An initial tsunami warning was issued and then lifted by the Indonesian Agency for Meteorology, Climatology and Geophysics (BKMKG), which anticipated a tsunami in the range of 0.5–3 meters. Underwater tsunami detectors had been destroyed in the earthquake. It is unusual for a strike-slip earthquake to cause a tsunami, in this case of the Palu-Koro Fault, to trigger a large tsunami.

⁸ In combination, the earthquake, tsunami and resultant liquefaction and landslides caused significant damage and loss of life, and wide-spread damage to public infrastructure, including roads, bridges, schools, health centres, hotels and Palu airport. As at November 23, 2018, the Indonesia's National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) figures for loss and damages⁹ were as follows:

- 2,101 people are known to have died, including 1,700 in Palu
- 1,373 people reported missing
- 131,631 people internally displaced (decreased from an initial estimate of 171,552)
- 4,438 people with major injuries
- 68,541 houses damaged (15,000 houses and land completely devastated, and 17,000 houses destroyed but with land that may be salvageable)
- Emergency shelter required for approximately 35,000 families
- Estimated material loss, US\$9.1 billion

On October 1, 2018, the Government of Indonesia (GoI) decided to welcome contributions from the international humanitarian community, with a specific request for key items.^{9,10} With support from ASEAN and in keeping with roles delineated in Indonesia's National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF), a Joint Operations and Coordination Centre for International Assistance (JOCCIA) was established, with a coordination mandate from the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB). On October 5th, BNPB and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA) clarified that the GoI had decided to restrict the presence of foreign humanitarian workers in the affected areas; and that any surge capacity related to the same would be restricted to the headquarters of the INGO (e.g. Jakarta),¹¹ as illustrated in Annex 7 by a graphic issued by the AHA Centre on October 8. BNPB received international off-shore assistance from 22 countries, transported by air from Balikpapan on the island of Kalimantan to Palu.¹² The intermediate relief phase ended on October 26, with the closure of the air bridge from Balikpapan, followed by an emergency transition phase. In mid-December, the Governor of Sulawesi extended the emergency transition phase to recovery phase from December 26 until February 23, 2019. On February 19, the transition phase was further extended to April 28, 2019.

On October 5, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) produced a Central Sulawesi Earthquake Response Plan for October-December 2018, seeking US\$50.5 million to provide immediate humanitarian assistance to 191,000 people.¹³ At the end of January, the appeal was 40% funded.¹⁴ Indonesia received bilateral and organisational support from close to 50 countries. In combination with other funds, this brought total contributions to US\$60 million by mid-November.

During the week of October 1-5, a cluster approach was activated with GoI Ministries designated in National Lead roles, with international support from the UN and major humanitarian agencies in co-lead roles (See Annex 6). Among DEC/SwS organisations, Save the Children, Oxfam and IFRC (with British and Swiss Red Cross support) assumed cluster co-lead roles.

On October 4, the DEC launched the DEC Indonesia Tsunami Appeal to support member agencies in responding to humanitarian needs in Central Sulawesi.¹⁵ The appeal raised £17.4 million in its first two weeks¹⁶ and as of 7th February 2019, £28.6million had been raised, with £19.9million channelled directly to the DEC, including £2million from the UK Government's Aid Match scheme, and the remaining £8.7 million donated directly to DEC members. Phase I covers months 1-6 and Phase II, months 7-24. Meanwhile, SwS held an appeal day on 6 October 2018 and by the end of the month has raised CHF10.5 million (£8 million), with the total standing at about CHF13.6 million at time of writing.

Initially, ASEAN's AHA Centre reviewed international offers of assistance with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, coordinated situation reports and provided capacity support to BNPB. Of the UN humanitarian agencies, WFP provided significant logistical support and services to common partners during the

⁹ In part because national buffer stocks of key emergency response items, such as tents and water treatment supplies, had been deployed to address a series of earthquakes in Lombok three months prior to the disaster.

¹⁰ An October 3rd letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) to the AHA centre specified the types of foreign assistance needed: i. Air transportation (preferably C-130 or alike), ii. Tents (shelter kits), iii. Water treatment, iv. Electric generators, v. Financial donations from the foreign governments and international organisations to be channelled through National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB). It suggested that financial donations from the Red Cross, international and local NGOs be channelled to the Indonesian Red Cross (PMI). With support from ASEAN and in keeping with roles delineated in Indonesia's National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF), a Joint Operations and Coordination Centre for International Assistance (JOCCIA) was established, with a coordination mandate from BNPB.

¹¹ <https://reliefweb.int/report/indonesia/aha-centre-situation-update-no-8-m-74-earthquake-and-tsunami-sulawesi-indonesia>

¹² including generators, mobile power plants, heavy equipment trucks, medical equipment, aircraft spare parts, clean water equipment, sanitary equipment, public kitchens, family tents, food, and blankets during the first weeks after the disaster

¹³ in Logistics, Displacement and Protection (including Shelter, Camp Management, WASH, Child Protection, Gender-Based Violence), Food Security, Health, Education and Early Recovery

¹⁴ As of January 30, 2019, the UNOCHA Financial Tracking Service reports that the HCT response plan is 39%, or US\$19.7 million, funded, including a contribution from the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) of US\$14.4 million. (i.e. only US\$5.3 million has come to the appeal from sources other than the CERF). <https://fts.unocha.org/>. The CERF is funding logistics, water sanitation and hygiene (WASH), camp management, health, shelter, protection and food security and livelihoods projects.

¹⁵ All 14 members supported the fundraising, while 13 members are responding through national affiliates and local partners.

¹⁶ including £2 million DFID AidMatch funding. £13.7 million (79%) was raised directly from the public by the DEC.

first three months of the emergency but left Palu on December 31.¹⁷ UNOCHA likewise completed its work facilitating the coordination of UN and NGOs in support of the Government's effort on January 15, 2019, passing this responsibility to UNDP as the Co-Coordinator for Early Recovery.¹⁸ UNOCHA may still be engaged on specific aspects of the response from Jakarta. UNICEF's significant presence in Palu is scheduled to phase out in April 2019.

The Government extended the closing date of recovery phase from 26 December 2018 to 23 February 2019. The provincial cluster system, while still in place, is transitioning to a district level cluster system over the first quarter of 2019. Nation-wide elections, including for President, parliamentarians and governors, will be held on April 17, 2019 and could influence the leadership and implementation of the reconstruction and rehabilitation phase.

2.1 Humanitarian Needs Identified

A Rapid Joint Needs Assessment (JNA) was conducted in Palu, Donggala and Sigi districts from October 3-9, by a mixed team from UN agencies, international, national and local agencies, among them several DEC/SwS implementing partners.¹⁹ The results of the JNA have been widely used by DEC/ SwS organisations and partners for planning their Phase I interventions. Subsequently, various sector-based technical assessments were used to identify priority needs and inform response plans,²⁰ and identified risks relating to damaged structures (including 1,500 classrooms), limited access to sanitation, poor lighting in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, elevated levels of diarrhoea and skin infections, with half the population subject to food shortages.

The National Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) began to formulate a Master Plan for Central Sulawesi Recovery and Reconstruction following consultations in the province and in Jakarta at the same time. The plan is due to be released in the coming weeks. A December 3 Governor's decree concerning shelter standards specified that humanitarian agencies which build shelters must coordinate plans and report to the Government.²¹ A map was released by the Government on December 22, 2018 which categorized the land across the affected areas into four zones, reflecting their susceptibility to future disasters.²² By the time of the review visit to Palu, no further information had been provided concerning relocation plans or compensation to those individuals with residences

¹⁷ As part of the exit strategy, WFP conducted a three-day practical emergency logistics training for 40 participants from government and non-government institutions to enhance their skills to operate an emergency hub. The National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) and the Provincial Disaster Management Agency (BPBD) were further assisted in establishing a dedicated logistics hub in Palu, consisting of four Mobile Storage Units (MSUs).

¹⁸ Five ex UNOCHA staff are due to return to Palu for 2-3 months to support the government information management capacity, working under UNDP.

¹⁹ The methodology was purposive random sampling using key informant interviews, with the related collation of secondary and primary data (from before and after the earthquake). The informants included male, female and mixed groups in an array of displacement sites including camps, informal IDPs centres, public buildings, land adjacent to homes, with host families, and in original homes. In 242 households in 4 districts (Donggala, Palu, Sigi, Parigi Mountong), 29 sub-districts and 107 villages. In total, 113 men and 63 women were individually interviewed, and 33 men and 33 women participated in group discussions.

²⁰ Other assessment exercises include:

GRADE. The World Bank conducted a Global Rapid Post-Disaster Damage Estimation (GRADE), which estimated total economic damages at over US\$500 million, comprised of approximately US\$180m in the housing sector; US\$185m for commercial/industrial buildings; and US\$165m for infrastructure. The study was released in mid-October.

PDNA. A Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) was implemented by UN and governmental agencies in November –December, 2018, but the results had been released at the time of this review.

²¹ It set budgets for rebuilding houses at:

IDR 40 – 50 million per household for damaged or collapsed houses (US\$ 2900-3500)

IDR 15 – 20 million per household for moderately-damaged houses (US\$ 1075 –1450)

IDR 5-10 million per household for lightly-damaged households (US\$ 350-700)

²² These are:

1. Normal development zone that should follow applicable standards
2. Conditional zone, where residential building construction standards should be adjusted to the level of disaster risk
3. Restricted zone, where the construction of critical and high-risk facilities (e.g. hospitals, schools and other infrastructure) is prohibited; residential building standards should be adjusted;
4. Prohibited zones, where the reconstruction and development of houses are prohibited, and existing houses should be relocated (these are also called "red zones" and include shorefront properties, as well as those affected by liquefaction).

in the restricted zone, the majority of whom are living in IDP camps. According to officials interviewed, that responsibility will be delegated to local governments.²³

2.2 Current DEC/SwS funded activities in Indonesia

The DEC and SwS appeals were timely, launched on October 4th and 6th 2018 respectively. Of a total of £12 million allocated to 13 DEC members organisations for Phase I, members have budgeted £6.4 million for the first six months, with WASH, cash transfers, shelter and education taking up 75% the DEC members initial budgets. For SwS partners, a total of CHF1,918,699 has been allocated so far, with a focus on shelter, WASH, cash transfers and NFI (initial SwS projects had a ceiling of CHF300,000). Annex 5 summarises the DEC and SwS funded Phase I response activities.

2.3 Operating Context

Gaining an understanding of the operating context for the central Sulawesi earthquake is important for any consideration of the current and future role of the organisations in the response. For this reason, it is discussed in some detail below.

2.3.1 National Regulatory Environment

As noted by all informants, the Government plays a determining role in how international and national NGOs contribute to disaster response. Indonesia has a long history and growing capacity in disaster management and has developed a clearly defined regulatory environment for disaster management. The Government of Indonesia's National Disaster Response Framework (NDRF) of March 2018²⁴ describes disaster management as a shared responsibility among central and local governments, line ministries and related civil society stakeholders. The NDRF sets out the roles and responsibilities of national and international partner organisations.^{25,26} International organisations are not free to operate according to the standard Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) architecture and tools. However, the Government accepts that NGOs should work to Sphere Standards in the emergency phase and the local clusters have used them in their planning.

The NDRF assigns responsibility for national disasters to the BNPB, and to the Provincial Disaster Management Agency (BPBD) for disasters that affect one or more districts within a province. After some initial confusion, the disaster was categorised as provincial in scale, with responsibilities passed progressively from national to provincial structures (and now increasingly to district authorities).²⁷

2.3.2 Implications for Central Sulawesi Operating Response

The implementation of the response in Central Sulawesi can be viewed as a field-based enactment of Indonesia's national law on disasters, and the efforts of national and international NGOs to support the response led by national, provincial and district authorities. The dynamic of this interaction was a recurring theme of our review discussions. According to key informants, the first 30 days of the response was confused by ambiguity about respective national and provincial responsibilities, a

²³ The region is highly susceptible to flooding, and floods, landslides and a tornado battered the region during the week after the team's departure, killing 68 and displacing 7,000 in neighbouring South Sulawesi as of January 28, 2019. 5,000 households were submerged.

²⁴ Available in hard copy in English at UNOCHA office, Jakarta.

²⁵ Informed by Regulation 22 of 2010: The Role of International Organisations and Foreign Non-Government Organisations During Emergency Response (Disaster Management Agency) <https://www.ifrc.org/docs/idrl/877EN.pdf>

²⁶ In addition:

- The NDRF specifies that coordination arrangements between regional and international partners be done in accordance with ASEAN-regional and international protocols.
- The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) is described as a strategic and operational decision-making and oversight forum established by the United Nations and humanitarian partners. In the event of a large-scale disaster, the HCT may make an offer of international assistance. If accepted, the HCT acts to ensure 'strategic coherence' among international humanitarian organisations, plus appropriate sectoral coordination, in support of national and local authorities and structures.
- Domestic NGOs are described as key partners in preparedness activities, response operations and recovery activities, playing a "vital role" at local, provincial and national levels in delivering response core capabilities.

²⁷ In part because the extent of the damage and fatalities remained unclear in the initial period after the disaster because of communications, electrical outages, and destruction of roads, all of which prevented information flow from more remote areas, such as Donggala

proliferation of both government and non-government actors, and coordination structures which took time to become functional.^{28,29} Provincial officials did not anticipate a disaster of this scale and complexity (simultaneous earthquake, tsunami and liquefaction events) in their contingency plans.³⁰

Provincial authorities, led by the Governor, the Regional Secretariat (SEKDA), and the BPBD have increasingly assumed a more central role. They have recently issued a series of regulations and decrees and more are likely to follow. Provincial and district capacity to manage the response is stretched. Responsibilities are being further devolved to the municipality of Palu and the districts of Sigi and Donggala, with the development of “Action Plans”. There is discussion of a simplified cluster system at the local level, with which some of the organisations have started to engage. The ex-OCHA staff now contracted to UNDP in Palu may be tasked with helping to strengthen the foundation for district level coordination.

2.3.3 Coordination Structures

The disaster management coordination structures in Sulawesi correspond to the NDRF as described above³¹ (See also Annex 6). Eight clusters were established (Health, Education, Logistics, Infrastructure and Facilities, Economy, Early Recovery, Search and Rescue, WASH and Displacement and Protection).³² In early February, a Livelihoods cluster was added. Over recent months, five working groups have been formed to try to improve government and NGO coordination around specific issues: (1) better information management among NGOs, (2) community engagement and accountability, (3) cash working group, (4) prevention of sexual abuse and exploitation, and (5) adolescents.

3 Good practices

The TOR asked the review team to collect good practices from which the DEC and SwS might learn for the remainder of this response, or response to future emergencies. These include:

3.1 Going to scale

Despite the coordination and operational difficulties faced by NGOs in the emergency relief phase, and the uneven mobilisation and partial coverage achieved, emergency relief items were widely distributed to tens of thousands of people affected by the disaster through a combined effort of the Government, United Nations, international and national NGOs and local groups.³³ IDP camps were established and serviced. DEC/SwS organisations have played a significant part in the overall response, as acknowledged by the authorities. The organisations made, and continue to make, significant efforts to overcome the many implementation challenges and to adapt to the operating environment, including working productively with the authorities at local levels.

3.2 Harnessing national capacity

A key positive feature of the response was the utilisation of national staff capacity, both within DEC/SWS organisations, and in local partners. Organisations mobilised their Indonesian personnel from within the country and also called them from their international postings to help the response in Central Sulawesi.³⁴ This was key to some organisations being able to deploy quickly. They have been

²⁸ Provincial officials were themselves severely affected by the disaster and many left Palu for some time, leaving their posts temporarily vacant

²⁹ It is worth noting that the national response capacity has also been taken up in addressing the aftermath of the earthquakes in Lombok in July/August 2018

³⁰ Disaster events in Central Sulawesi usually revolve around landslides and floods. Major earthquakes on the Palu-Koro fault are estimated to happen approximately once in 700 years, according to an analysis of the fault line

³¹ This is relatively new humanitarian response architecture for Indonesia and is a national adaptation of the cluster approach used in previous responses to major disasters.

³² Under health is a sub-cluster for nutrition. The Displacement and Protection Cluster is responsible for several sub-clusters: Camp Coordination and Camp Management, Shelter, WASH, and Protection, which is further sub-divided into specific issues: Child Protection, Protection of Women’s Rights/GBV, Older People, vulnerable groups living with HIV/AIDS, and Psychosocial Support. The national clusters are led by line ministries, with co-leads usually appointed from UN agencies. Organisations affiliated with DEC and SwS have been appointed as co-leads in the instances of Education (Save the Children), Infrastructure (IFRC).

³⁴ Some national technical experts travel from Jakarta and elsewhere to provide support rather than being based in Sulawesi

able to demonstrate their disaster management experience built up over the years in previous disaster responses in Indonesia (Aceh, Yogyakarta, Padang). Similarly, some of the organisations have employed staff and volunteers from the relevant sub-districts who know the local context intimately and understand the local community dynamics and language.³⁵

3.3 Core Humanitarian Standard

Most of the DEC/SwS organisations have given considerable attention to the CHS as the guiding set of principles to be applied during this crisis. Training courses have been provided to staff and volunteers. In the survey, respondents rated their organisations delivery against the CHS commitments as 'Good' (see Annex 9). Alongside the CHS, Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) is being actively promoted to staff and volunteers, with briefings and training courses. The organisations recognise that further training is needed for CHS and PSEA commitments to be fully embedded.

3.4 Feedback and complaints mechanisms

A notable feature of this response is the wide use of feedback and complaints systems. Some of these make sophisticated use of information technology. We heard about and saw some complaint boxes and tables set up for non-food item (NFI) and other distributions. Several organisations have set up hotlines.³⁶ Some organisations have extensive data on individual pieces of feedback provided by community members, and are able to analyse them by type, and in some cases, in real-time. An existing referral system will hopefully expand under the umbrella of the Community Engagement and Accountability working group.

3.5 Community consultation

Several organisations have undertaken extensive consultation with communities about the nature and focus of their projects. Organisations described examples of where they had adjusted their projects in response to the feedback received³⁷ (Some survey respondents questioned whether this feedback was being used systematically for decision-making.) Most organisations have engaged directly with communities in order to identify the most vulnerable and, in some cases, iterative processes have been employed to arrive at confirmed sets of names for those requiring support.

Some communities, especially at the beginning, resisted attempts by aid agencies to target individuals or individual families but communities are now more accepting that some families require more assistance than others, partly because agencies do not have the resources to continue the blanket support that was initially government policy.³⁸ Some organisations have been working through local faith groups and networks to increase community engagement. The Community Engagement and Accountability group led in Phase I by PMI/IFRC conducted an initial rapid assessment of communication and information needs. Life-saving messages were transmitted via social media and by radio.³⁹

3.6 Supporting vulnerable groups

The organisations specifically devoted to the needs of vulnerable groups have been drawing attention to the needs of people with disabilities, the elderly, children, female-headed households, and other vulnerable groups with some success. Partly as a result, there is a commitment that organisations' Phase II proposals will give more consistent attention to vulnerable groups.

3.7 NGO cooperation

DEC/SwS organisations have done well in ensuring that they are not competing or duplicating the same services in the same areas. Where duplication has taken place by accident, i.e. due to insufficient coordination especially in the early days, it has generally been resolved. Compared with

³⁵ As some communities have indigenous tribes with their own languages

³⁶ The review team was not sure that it was necessary to have separate hotline for each individual agency.

³⁷ For example, ActionAid took action on waste management following consultation with communities.

³⁸ Some organisations are actively engaging communities in the design of transitional individual shelters. This approach is more empowering, sustainable, dignified and cost-effective than pre-determined designs imposed from outside.

³⁹ The radio broadcast was planned only as a short-term intervention but continues to broadcast each week by popular demand.

some other disaster responses, there has been a relatively low level of competition between agencies, except perhaps in relation to recruiting skilled staff and for local partners. There is strong cooperation, for example, in water treatment and delivery. The best performing sectors are developing common standards, exchanging information and making common approaches to government. The current level of cooperation is, however, lower than that required for a fully complementary response of the type envisaged in Recommendation 2 below.

The review team noted the lack of an NGO forum⁴⁰ that brings together a wide range of local NGOs for information sharing and mutual capacity development. INGOs might consider how to support such a forum in future.

3.8 Application of technologies

Amongst several examples, the review team noted:

- Electronic cash payments. After an unsuccessful struggle and significant delay in trying to get a national bank to support electronic payment of cash grants, an arrangement has successfully been forged with Central Sulawesi Commercial Bank for handling cash transfers, with recipients using individual bank accounts to withdraw cash via ATMs;⁴¹
- Mobile technology. Some organisations are using data capture in the community when undertaking assessments, distributions or post distribution monitoring. Data entered directly into smartphones provides real-time results. The Microsoft application Power Bi is proving a useful tool as a graphical display tool;⁴²
- 'Skyhydrants'. These robust water filters have been installed a number of villages. They are hand operated and require no chemicals, pumps or electricity;
- Solar panels. Solar panel and battery units have been installed for some households where there was no power supply before the earthquake.

3.9 Joint assessments

Some DEC/SwS organisations have demonstrated good practice in undertaking joint assessment exercises, in part because of feedback from the authorities that they should avoid over-burdening communities with repeated assessments. Joint assessments (not necessarily DEC/SwS funded) include:

- 'Joint Needs Assessment'⁴³, October 2018 (including; CARE Indonesia, Caritas, CRS, Save the Children Indonesia, World Vision Indonesia);
- 'Market Assessment in Central Sulawesi', December 2018 (WFP, Oxfam, and World Vision)
- 'Listening to Children', December 2018 (Plan Indonesia, World Vision Indonesia, Save the Children Indonesia, UNICEF);
- Joint structural assessment of schools (UNICEF, Save the Children Indonesia, World Vision Indonesia, Plan Indonesia);
- Joint assessment of Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices related to WASH by World Vision, Save the Children, Oxfam and YKMI
- Joint gender assessment, led by CARE;
- Comprehensive Gender Assessment, jointly conducted by UNFPA, UN Women, Yayasan Plan International, Oxfam and Ministry of PPPA.

4 Issues Arising

4.1 Shortcomings in the overall response

Within the limitation of a challenging operating environment, the immediate humanitarian response took time to mobilise. Some communities were not reached in a timely way. The response as a whole

⁴⁰ The review team interviewed a local organisation whose name was translated as 'NGO forum', which brings together a set of local NGOs for advocacy purposes.

⁴¹ The regional bank also offers mobile banking to bring ATMs closer to the recipients. There is however, a charge for the use of ATMs, while the use of passbooks remains free.

⁴² Data from the Joint Rapid Needs Assessment of October 2018 was posted to the Internet using Power Bi. See <https://bit.ly/2RnUd7x>

⁴³ The JNA was a collaboration of the Emergency Capacity Building consortium and Humanitarian Forum Indonesia and others

does not appear to be keeping up with the changing needs of the affected population as people try to rebuild their lives. Tens of thousands of people are still living in tents and have lost their livelihoods. Progress in the construction of shelters, both individual households and communal is limited, and multipurpose cash has been slow to mobilise. The relevant government regulations were not issued for 45-60 days after the disaster. This means that affected populations have had to rely on their own coping strategies, with the concomitant risks and vulnerabilities. Many of the delays and limitations in the response have arisen due to factors outside the control of the DEC and SwS organisations.

4.2 Shortcomings in Coordination and Complementarity

Sector coordination was somewhat chaotic at the beginning but has since improved between NGOs and between the Government and NGOs. The Provincial Secretary is now the key focal point for province level coordination. The strength of sector coordination is variable.⁴⁴ As the UN presence in Palu will have largely ended by April-May 2019, NGOs will need to continue to coordinate amongst themselves and with the Government. A clearer set of management arrangements may be included in the forthcoming Master Plan.

The challenges experienced with coordination is one of the main themes of the review. As reported, these included: clusters not coordinating between Jakarta/Palu levels; Jakarta level clusters have been playing an increasingly limited role with regard to the response in Sulawesi; and international staff of INGOs not being able to take part in coordination meetings in Palu or make use of meeting records issued in Bahasa Indonesia.^{45,46} It was not clear how clusters were prioritising. Information sharing between clusters was, and perhaps still is, inadequate.

Some INGOs felt they had inadequate access to information from the clusters and from government to make well-informed and timely decisions, including site selection and the nature of their interventions.^{47,48}

Coordination is said to be improving, with coordination structures at both provincial level and potentially at city and district level. NGOs reporting via these structures will soon become mandatory (DEC/SwS organisations already comply). NGOs need to be fully engaged in the coordination structures. Achieving complementarity between NGOs will require a higher level of joint strategy and organisation than is currently the case.

4.3 Procurement

Difficulty in obtaining sufficient supplies of the right standard has been a challenge from the start of the response. In the on-line survey, procurement was one of the most frequently mentioned challenges. In the first two weeks of the emergency, an airbridge was established to allow the transport of emergency relief goods. The rapid reopening of the airport at Palu after the earthquake was an important achievement by the authorities.⁴⁹

According to the December 2018 market assessment, markets recovered quickly. However, there are not enough major suppliers in Palu to handle the large volumes of materials required for construction and other purposes. Because international procurement is heavily restricted, there are too many customers chasing too few suppliers, and procurement procedures can be lengthy. As WFP left Palu in December, there is no longer an effective logistics coordination forum through which alternative solutions can be discussed.

⁴⁴ With the departure of IOM, there is said to be no effective coordination of camp management currently.

⁴⁵ Some clusters have generated summary records in English

⁴⁶ National staff, by contrast, report being comfortable working in the Indonesian cultural and language environment.

⁴⁷ While expressing gratitude for the NGO contribution, government has had its own frustrations with the way some NGOs have been operating. NGOs were perceived as often going straight to the village, without reporting back to the government on their interventions. For example, NGO failures to report on NFI distribution in Sigi had led to an over-supply of items in Sigi and an under-supply in Donggala.

⁴⁸ Only about 140 of the 300 active NGOs were correctly registered, and many did not report their results, so aggregate sector results could not be generated. Many NGOs operating for the short-term after the disaster are said to have left Palu

⁴⁹ As often with unsolicited goods, they were not all of the required standard and time was lost in sorting and repackaging. Given the high cost of air freight, some agencies also transported goods by truck from Makassar and elsewhere in Sulawesi.

4.4 Shelter

4.4.1 Transitional shelter for households

Some of the organisations, including IFRC with National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, provided significant volumes of tents and tarpaulins for the emergency response, supplemented by UN donations.⁵⁰ Attention has now shifted to supporting the construction of transitional shelter, especially for individual households whose houses have been damaged or destroyed but which still retain their own land. This is likely to be a major focus of Phase II proposals.

Several of the organisations involved have already supported shelter reconstruction and plan to offer further assistance in Phase II through a combination of cash transfer, the provision of building materials, and training for artisans and community members. There is a consensus that cash-based assistance, with technical oversight, will be the most appropriate delivery modality for shelter, and that those receiving shelter assistance should continue to be consulted on shelter design. Due to a lack of resources, some of the DEC/SwS organisations are revising their shelter targets downward or are seeking more funds to meet the original target over a longer time frame. The combined planned contribution of NGOs to shelter needs to be reviewed in the Shelter cluster.

In the learning workshop, the shelter breakout group observed that some agencies are still trying to ascertain, within the regulatory environment, if there is an appropriate role for them in shelter. Progress is hampered by a lack of clear guidance from the Government on engineering standards, which has implications in terms of rollout and cost. Unresolved issues regarding land, zoning and relocation plans are further obstacles. NGOs do not want to invest resources into shelter and find later that their effort has been wasted by supporting construction in the 'wrong' place.

It is reported that the Government has stated that when the transition period ends in April, the need for transitional shelter will also end. However, in practice, it is likely to take years before the construction of permanent houses is completed. Meanwhile, a decree on cash support to transitional shelter has been issued. Once the election has passed, further discussion on transitional shelters with the authorities may be required. If the Government does not allow further transitional shelter construction, DEC/SWS organisations will need to modify their shelter strategies.

4.4.2 Communal shelters

In the early days of the response, the President committed to provide shelter for all those whose land and/or property had been lost entirely. Only families that occupy the shelters will receive land in relocation zones. The Department of Public Works programme for the construction of 'long-house' multi-household shelters ('huntara') has become the centre of the Government's response to the disaster.⁵¹ Of 22,784 units required, just over a quarter have been completed or are underway, at the time of writing, with funds available to meet about half the total requirement.⁵² The review team observed that some shelters did not have functional WASH facilities.⁵³ Some shelters have no water source, and others have already been damaged. The Government cited the lack of building materials, land and trained labour as primary constraints to the pace of the construction.

Questions over the suitability of these temporary communal shelters surfaced repeatedly during our visit.⁵⁴ The shelters make little provision for security, privacy or the inclusion of people with disabilities,

⁵⁰ The Government did not formally declare standards for emergency shelter, so shelter specifications differed, even in the same location (the Government stated up front that it would not issue shelter standards)

⁵¹ The publicly-constructed units are 17 square meters per unit, built in blocks of 12, and are designed to have shared water and sanitation facilities

⁵² According to the Central Sulawesi Centre for Disaster Management and Relief (PUSDATINA) 22,784 transitional shelters are required on 207 sites. Under a Department of Public Works programme, by December 31 2018, 4,911 temporary shelters were in the process, with 1,426 units completed. When complete, this will meet 28% of the stated need. Funding from all sources has been identified to bring this total to 11,666 units (51% of total need).

⁵³ HCT Situation Report #12 as of 7 January 2019 (final HCT report for the Central Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami)

⁵⁴ The shelters, constructed of plasterboard and steel, with shared walls, were reported to be unpopular for a variety of reasons, including cultural unacceptability of living in close proximity to neighbours, perceived actual lack of services, including water and sanitation. It may be that local residents "occupy" a room in these shelters while in practice living somewhere else, to make sure that they retain a right to any government assistance that may be available, including relocation to newly constructed settlements (as

giving rise to many social issues, and potentially increasing vulnerability for women, adolescents and girls. Some of these challenges were blamed on the ‘top-down’ implementation of the construction process that failed to consult communities in advance. Despite NGO promotion of ‘inclusive toilets’ suitable for the elderly and people with disabilities, the Government has not incorporated the inclusive design. The local authorities are now asking NGOs to help make these multi-household shelters more habitable.⁵⁵ Some NGOs see this invitation as an open door to provide vitally important assistance to people affected. Others are unsure whether to associate themselves with an initiative some consider controversial, and their resources are in any case limited.

4.5 Water Sanitation and Hygiene

WASH is one of the largest sub-clusters in the Central Sulawesi response, with some 45 organisations listed by the sub-cluster, although some are phasing out. Only 6 members have confirmed that they are planning to continue operations until 2020. It is not possible for the sub-cluster to report collective results⁵⁶ because only 7 of the 45 participants provide the relevant statistics and some do not attend coordination meetings (the authorities have issued a decree that will oblige all NGOs to report results). Waste management remains a major issue in the camps and municipal areas in Palu and Sigi, exacerbated by the rainy season. The government task force has stopped providing support for garbage trucks. Improved drainage is needed to keep facilities free of standing wastewater. This is especially important in an area susceptible to malaria and dengue.

The earthquake, tsunami, and liquefaction all damaged water systems within the affected area significantly. Irrigation canals are fractured and unusable, with a major impact on farming. The authorities have made limited progress so far in repairing these systems. Several of the organisations have been providing water pumping, storage, filtration and trucking, increasingly in collaboration with each other. We saw more than one example of an NGO pumping, storing and treating water, and a number of others trucking the water to various camps and other locations. However, water trucking is the least favoured option for the provision of clean water because of its high and recurrent costs. NGOs are looking for how they can transition from water trucking to other medium-term solutions, such as boreholes.⁵⁷ Water and waste management focal points need to be identified and trained, in part to increase the attention paid to hygiene.

Some NGOs are engaging directly with the authorities, including district water companies, to see how they can best support them technically and to provide demonstration pilot water and sanitation solutions that the Government might adopt more widely.⁵⁸ Some organisations’ proposals for Phase II may include engagement with local authorities in planning and/or implementing transitional water and sanitation systems.

4.6 Livelihoods

The Government’s Master Plan for Recovery and Reconstruction estimates a 4.5% decrease in provincial economic growth because of the disaster, while the number of people living below the poverty line is projected to increase to 15.8%.⁵⁹ The loss of livelihoods tends to trigger negative

some families have done in the IDP tented camps). One informant said they had seen families happily settled in the huntara and that the main challenge was for those moved to huntara far from their original villages. By contrast, the government was taken to task by community members about the huntara construction programme at a public consultation on district recovery plans held during the review team’s visit.

⁵⁵ Mayor of Palu has already made an appeal to one or more organisation for help

⁵⁶ From the group’s reporting, as of mid-January, 62 water trucks from several organisations were delivering water to 207 IDP sites, with relatively high operating costs, and over 600 toilets had been constructed (for the 133,631 IDPs).

⁵⁷ Also viable, though we did not hear any discussion of such solutions, is rain water harvesting

⁵⁸ It is not clear where the three districts affected will find the resources for the major repair works required. It will likely be several years before these systems are fully functional. The DEC and SwS humanitarian funding is not designed to support these major reconstruction works. Once the PDNA is complete, resources may be forthcoming from central government, the Asian Development Bank and other donors. The Government’s recovery and reconstruction effort will be boosted by a recently announced US\$25 million grant from the KfW German development bank via UNDP.

⁵⁹ or 481,000 people, in 2019, due to the disaster (the affected areas account for about 30% of the province). The national poverty rate was 14.2% in 2017. However, this is not an accurate comparison as poverty rates in the province would have been lower than the national average given relative high productivity of the region province with some others

coping mechanisms and economic pressures push girls, especially, into early marriages or higher-risk livelihoods, child labour and school drop-out.⁶⁰

It is estimated that full economic recovery will take at least four years. In the districts affected, many families were entirely dependent on agriculture and/or fisheries and have lost considerable assets. The FAO has warned that without a revival in crop and livestock production, families may become dependent on external food aid.⁶¹ The RTR site visits confirmed that the restoration of livelihoods was of central concern in the villages visited and was one of the most frequent challenges identified by leaders, key informants, groups and partner staff, and in the online survey. As livelihoods was not developed as a sector in Phase I, there are few concrete ideas on restoring livelihoods so far and no communication from government on its plans for improving livelihoods.⁶²

The Lesson Learning workshop breakout group on livelihoods formed a WhatsApp group during the workshop and has already started an inter-agency dialogue.

4.7 Cash Transfers

The Palu Cash Working Group is led by Provincial Social Welfare Office of Central Sulawesi and co-led and supported by World Vision Indonesia and Oxfam.

In the Palu response, the Government has issued two technical guidelines to harmonise the implementation of cash assistance:

- Guideline for cash for work (Padat Karya) approved on November 15 2018, agreeing a daily cash-for-work incentive of IDR 80,000 (US\$6)/day plus IDR 11,000 (US\$1) per month for health insurance, with a maximum of 30 days of work;
- Guideline for multi-purpose cash (MPC) grants, approved in January 2019, setting rates for cash disbursements to those with damaged or destroyed houses.

The multi-purpose cash agreed under the second decree is for a maximum of three months.

The GoI is committed to covering multi-purpose cash grants for beneficiaries living in government-constructed temporary shelters. With agreement of the Government, NGOs will focus their cash-based assistance on those temporary shelters not provided by the Government, to avoid duplication and increase coverage. The Government has approved electronic disbursements and has asked that “cash in hand” grants should no longer be used.^{63,64}

⁶⁰ The review teams has no data but we heard anecdotal evidence of, for example, early marriage being used as a way of ‘protecting’ girls

⁶¹ The forthcoming Post Disaster Needs Assessment is said to include a comprehensive needs assessment on agriculture and should provide more details on damage and loss to food security and livelihood assets.

⁶² The Learning Workshop breakout group on livelihoods identified multiple constraints:

- Wide devastation of fishing, farming, manufacturing, markets and demand for goods and services. Businesses and factories have closed.
- Total loss of assets, livelihoods and access to finance by some households
- Some land is a total loss and will now be permanently unproductive
- Irrigation systems and other infrastructure need to be restored.
- Some tenant farmers can no longer rent their land, as the owner had reoccupied it.
- Small-scale fishermen lost boats, motors, and fishing equipment.
- The proliferation of ministries concerned (Social Affairs, Women’s Empowerment, Industries and Trade, Labour, Cooperatives, Agriculture, etc) makes coordination difficult and leads to uncertainty about who needs to give permissions.
- No assessment on livelihoods seems to have been undertaken.

⁶³ They have received clearance and indeed encouragement from the OJK (the financial regulator in Indonesia).

⁶⁴ The learning workshop breakout group on cash transfers identified several other constraints:

- Registering for electronic transfers requires legal documents, such as identity cards and birth certificates. Many IDPs lost all their documents in the disaster.
- Some of the most vulnerable are illiterate, with no experience of financial institutions
- A household expenditure analysis to determine the value of the MEB (minimum expenditure basket)
- Not all organisations are using the same cash amounts; they need to harmonise to avoid inequities and controversy
- The national elections in May are politically sensitive with respect to cash transfers, particularly hard cash and vouchers. (YSTC has decided to suspend MPGs for a six-week period (March 8 – April 21) to avoid any appearance of impropriety)

The potential for cash transfers to have a major positive impact has not been fully realised. This slow progress represents a major missed opportunity. Delays arose principally from the time taken for the relevant decrees to be issued and from the time lost in unsuccessful negotiations with national banks to support electronic payment of cash grants. At least one organisation went ahead with medium to large scale cash transfers without waiting for the relevant decree to be authorised by the Governor.

The registration for multi-purpose cash grants is based on family cards/identity cards and some NGOs have been working to help families obtain new documents to replace those lost in the disaster. Many beneficiaries were not previously part of the social protection scheme and so are not in the relevant government database. Some organisations pointed to the need for fresh assessments of vulnerability, rather than relying on now outdated pre-disaster data. Some NGOs have devised their own intensive vulnerability assessment processes.

The decree on multi-purpose cash transfers signed by the Governor at the end of January removed the main barrier to multi-purpose cash-based assistance, and subsequently several INGOs have begun to implement large scale cash transfers. It is reported that there has been some overlap of beneficiaries amongst the various distributions. The April elections may cause the cash disbursement process to be temporarily halted. Discussion with the Government about the more general use of cash transfers for livelihood support has been initiated but it may take some months to reach an agreement.

The cash working group, which has experienced some internal tensions, now needs to come together to agree how to best combine the cash transfer strategies of cash for work, conditional cash transfers (e.g. for housing construction), and unconditional cash transfers.

4.8 Delayed decisions impact on the most heavily affected

Among the most heavily affected are people who previously lived in “high risk zones” (shoreline, those affected by liquefaction) for whom decisions about longer term relocation and compensation are pending leaving them in limbo, and more difficult to assist due to their transience, and uncertain futures. This includes those who lost their house, land, and all their assets, and those who previously lived in high-risk ‘red zones’, deemed uninhabitable and where it is now prohibited to live.⁶⁵ Among the most vulnerable are those families headed by children and women, who are often missing from camp rosters. Women who have lost their husbands are said to be stigmatised in some camps, as other women worry that they will attract their husbands.⁶⁶ Without long term plans as to their relocation, and compensation for shelter, land and other losses, it is difficult to deliver assistance such as permanent shelter and livelihoods related to farming and fishing, which are the backbone of the local economy. For example, a fisherman relocated 10 km from the shore may no longer find fishing a viable occupation.

4.9 Data for planning and management

It is hard to say to what extent humanitarian needs have been met as quality aggregate reports are not available. There have been challenges obtaining reliable data from the outset, which have weakened decision-making and coordination. Thanks to the rapid joint needs assessment and other sector assessments, data was available for planning. UNOCHA was not invited to perform its normal information management and coordination functions fully and withdrew from Palu in January 2019.⁶⁷

Assembling and agreeing consolidated results data at beneficiary levels is reported to have been a challenge throughout the response. Data disaggregated by gender, age, vulnerability status and disability status, etc. is only partially available at a provincial level and, without, it is hard to programme

⁶⁵ This would include those who lived within 200 meters of the shore, and those who lived on Dewi Sartika Road in South Palu and parts of the Petobo, Biromaru and Sidera subdistricts in Sigi.

⁶⁶ The majority of the worst-affected are living in IDP camps, although others have established temporary shelters in the forest, or may be camped out close to extended family members. (In some cases, they maintain a place in an IDP camp in order to receive associated benefits). They have often moved several times.

⁶⁷ 5 former UNOCHA staff are due to return to work with UNDP for two months in support of UNDP and the government data management

appropriately for protection or women's empowerment.⁶⁸ It is hard to escape the conclusion that poor quality data has, in some measure, reduced the effectiveness of the response, introduced inequalities, and increased protection risks.^{69,70}

4.10 Protection

As noted in section 4, protective services have had only limited reach so far in the response. 1,800 women and girls have benefited from women-friendly spaces and related psychosocial support services (PSS), which represents just 5% of women IDPs. A similar number of adolescents were reached (1,500). The CCCM cluster reported on December 21st, 2018, that two thirds of 437 IDP sites had no access to psychosocial support, nearly 3 months after the disaster.⁷¹ Several informants noted the lack of adequate psychosocial support and some signalled their intent to expand PSS in Phase II.

PSEA guidelines were adopted to enable affected communities to comment on HCT agencies' performance including on sensitive issues such as sexual exploitation and abuse by those associated with the provision of their aid and assistance. Some DEC/SwS organisations have actively promoted the PSEA guidelines. A PSEA workshop was held in mid-February to develop PSEA guidelines to be signed by Provincial Secretary. An HCT PSEA Network hotline was set up, and the first rounds of training undertaken. However, many communities have yet to participate.

Initial referral systems have also been initiated for Gender-Based Violence (GBV) at the community level. This is however, just a start. As of mid-January, 20 cases of GBV had been reported, along with one case of rape and one case of attempted rape according to UNFPA, which must represent a tiny proportion of actual incidents. Adolescent girls are frequently the target of sexual harassment, which is of serious concern in a province with one of the highest incidences of child marriage in Indonesia.^{72,73} Constraints highlighted by the learning workshop breakout group on protection included: lack of accurate data for decision-making, lack of participation of vulnerable groups in decision-making, and people with disabilities and the elderly often being invisible and neglected. Child protection services are said to be inadequate.

4.11 Skills shortages

As discussed in section 4, domestic NGOs, including national affiliates of DEC/SwS organisations, have had to scale up considerably in Central Sulawesi. Other INGOs have had to arrange for domestic NGOs to implement the funds raised, creating a competition for local partners and for skilled

⁶⁸ Data processed by the newly-formed provincial Disaster Data and Information Centre (PUSTADINA) are not disaggregated based on age, ethnicity, gender and other variables; likewise, at the Department of Social Affairs, there is a broad array of data collected using different templates in different locations; such an array of data prohibits any meaningful analysis of vulnerability and differential impact on gender.

⁶⁹ For example:

- There has been duplication of the key distribution of non-food items (NFI) because of duplicate targeting and the inadequate coordination of data.
- IDPs are still on the move, so target numbers of the displaced are subject to change.
- Difficulty of matching up separated children with their families if age has not been recorded
- Initially, it was unclear in the government structure as to which entity was responsible for releasing data on victims, which led to conflicting information.
- The IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix did not incorporate socio-economic information and disaggregated data in its design
- There is a tendency to conflate figures for households and families. Households are often multi-generational and multi-family, so providing assistance, for example, a cash grant, based on households is likely to underestimate needs
- Female and child-headed families may be under-represented in the data in the temporary shelters and may not be assistance for which they qualify.

⁷⁰ In the decentralised government structures, data flow upwards from the neighbourhood area (RW/RT) to the sub-village, the village, the sub-district, the district, and finally the province but there is no standard template used at the neighbourhood level

⁷¹ HCT Situation Reports # 11 and # 12 as of 21 December 2018 and 7 January 2019

⁷² 34.4% of girls are married before 18, some of them before 15 according to UNICEF's Policy Brief, Indonesia: Child Marriage: Progress at a Standstill, 2016

⁷³ Girls experience social and religious pressures to remain chaste until marriage. Where harassment gives rise to the appearance of impropriety in crowded shelters and IDP camps, yet more girls may be forced into early marriage, which can lead to a lifelong cycle of poverty.

personnel. The skills of INGO technical experts were only partially applied to the response as they were located remotely in Makassar or Jakarta, which was not optimal for their making a full contribution to the design of interventions, to training, problem-solving, and to monitoring. While all DEC/SwS organisations are committed to local capacity development, the high number of new hires and relative inexperience of some NGOs bring risks that affected populations may be receiving assistance from teams with insufficient experience and without sufficient oversight.⁷⁴

5 Real Time Review summary assessments

5.1 Summary assessment against the review questions

Drawing on the discussion above, Table 1 below provides a summary assessment of performance against each of the review questions, generalised across the 21 organisations. As the review comes at a relatively early stage in the response, 'performance' is not a comment on the humanitarian outcomes achieved.

Table 1: Summary assessment against the Real Time Response Review questions

Good Commitment and Application		Fair Commitment and Application	Poor Commitment and Application
Topic and questions/ Comments			
Operating Environment			
1.	How well have DEC members/SwS partners adapted their response to fit the operating environment, including Government leadership and limitations on INGO access?		
<i>Organisations have made and continue to make significant efforts to adapt themselves to the local operating context that is strongly controlled by government. Some NGOs have found the exclusion of INGOs and expatriates frustrating and feel that more progress would have been made if these restrictions were not in place. Government control of disaster response, with selective use of international resources and expertise will increasingly be the pattern, especially in Asia, and organisations need to adapt. Some of the organisations have had an Indonesian entity for some time, while others are newly formed or forming. The organisations that relied on forming new partnerships with local NGOs after the disaster have, overall, not been able to respond as quickly as others with an established local presence/partnership pre-disaster.</i>			
2.	How have DEC members/SwS partners engaged with the coordination structures and processes implemented for this response? (including cluster decision making, budgeting, communication). How have the coordination arrangements affected the operations of DEC Members/SwS partners and their local partners?		
<i>The organisations have taken an active part in government-led coordination processes, and as noted above some have provided cluster co-leadership. Coordination was weak and disorganised in the early stages, which impacted negatively on the overall response and on individual agencies response. Coordination is improving, with the Provincial Secretary now leading an inter-sector forum and NGOs have an opportunity to make a difference to the overall response by providing technical support to coordination at provincial and especially district levels.</i>			
Meeting humanitarian needs			
3.	How well have DEC members/SwS partners and their implementing partners been able to identify, target and include the most vulnerable in the response?		
<i>Organisations have made considerable efforts to identify the most vulnerable in communities affected, in some cases against the resistance of government and communities themselves. There was a measure of confusion and duplication of assistance in the early weeks, now resolved. While effort is certainly high, it is less clear that organisations have been working closely together to combine their identification of the most vulnerable. There is a consensus that vulnerable groups need further attention in Phase II.</i>			
4.	How quickly were DEC/SwS funded projects implemented?		
<i>Very variable performance in terms of organisations' speed of response, making it hard to generalise. Some started to respond within 48 hours, others have taken 2-3 months to start implementing projects.</i>			




⁷⁴ Three DEC members recognised these risks in their risk analysis. Risk mitigation strategies did not anticipate the level of partner-sharing.

	<i>Response at scale took time to mobilise due the several challenges discussed above, and data was not good enough to understand how well coverage was being achieved (and may still be).</i>	
5.	How well have DEC members/SwS partners analysed the relevant markets and responded to any shortages in supplies, e.g. shelter materials, medicines?	
	<i>An interagency rapid joint needs assessment was completed in October and a joint market assessment in December. Both were well used by NGOs in their planning. Some of the organisations brought contingency stocks from within Sulawesi and elsewhere in Indonesia. NGOs are now not allowed to use international procurement or to bring in their standardised emergency stocks from other countries. The Government has taxed the import of humanitarian supplies, which is against international disaster management norms.⁷⁵ Shortages of relief and construction supplies and the requirement to use local procurement has reduced the speed and reach of the response. If there are any particular inter-agency initiative to address supply bottlenecks, the review team did not hear about them.</i>	
6.	What progress has been made in sectors where DEC/SwS funds have principally been invested? What are the lessons and constraints from implementation so far? Are there gaps in the response, either in sectoral terms or geographic coverage that DEC members/SwS partners have not covered?	Not rated
	<i>Reports providing quantitative outputs have not been available to the review and are not assembled by the DEC or SwS across their organisations. The survey results (Annex 9) show that organisations are satisfied with the progress they have made. Informants were also clear that there are gaps in the response. The organisations are conscious that livelihoods support has been largely neglected so far. Cash-based programming, other than cash for work, has advanced slowly, in part because of government restrictions. It is unlikely that the organisations will have sufficient resources to cover the outstanding needs not covered by the Government.</i>	
Standards		
7.	In the view of DEC members/SwS partners, how successfully have they been able to apply the Core Humanitarian Standard?	
	<i>See separate CHS assessment in Table 2 below.</i>	
8.	Sphere standards (and related companion technical standards) to the response, including via local implementing partners? Have/how have benchmarks been adapted to the operating context? ⁷⁶	
	<i>The organisations have been committed to achieving the Sphere standards and they are discussed and used within the provincial clusters/working groups. There has been no adaptation of the benchmarks to the context as far as we know, and no discussion of whether this is possible or needed. Sphere benchmarks are confused (as so often) with Sphere standards.⁷⁷ In the online survey, respondents rated their organisations meeting of the Sphere standards very highly.</i>	
Accountability to affected people		
9.	To what extent are DEC members/SwS partners listening to and communicating with the communities affected, including hearing and resolving complaints, including the voices of the most disadvantaged (in line with CHS commitments 4 and 5)?	
	<i>See separate CHS assessment in Table 2 below.</i>	
Protection		
10.	What initiatives have DEC members/SwS partners taken to protect the most vulnerable, including children, GBV survivors, and the elderly, and to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian workers?	
	<i>As often in humanitarian response, initial attention has been more focused on physical outputs (tents erected, kits delivered, water supplied etc.). Data on the situation of affected populations is not sufficiently disaggregated. Phase II provides an opportunity to go deeper into protection/vulnerability issues. Some organisations have made significant efforts to identify and</i>	


⁷⁵ See International Disaster Response Law guidelines at <https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/idrl-guidelines/>

⁷⁶ This will not be a comprehensive assessment. Only sectors and cross-cutting issues that feature in several DEC members/SwS partners responses will be discussed/reviewed. This will be by self-assessment, not a 3rd party review against the respective standards.

⁷⁷ For example, the benchmark of 15 litres of clean water per day per person is taken as the standard rather than the benchmark. (Each Sphere standard is a qualitative human rights-based statement, not a measurement).

	<i>support vulnerable groups. PSEA training has been provided to staff and partners by several organisations but key informants acknowledge that more training and familiarisation is needed to ensure that communities are well protected from the abuses of power that can arise during aid operations.</i>	
11.	How well have DEC members/SwS partners applied a gender lens to ensure that the different needs of male and female beneficiaries are addressed?	
	<i>Hygiene kits were provided by many organisations. Women-friendly and girl-friendly spaces have been provided by some NGOs. Some gender analysis has been completed.⁷⁸ As discussed earlier, women and girls face various risks and disadvantages, for which the organisations should be doing more to address, even if there are cultural obstacles to doing so. Some organisations (e.g. ActionAid, CARE, Islamic Relief) are active on GBV but the scale of the problem is much larger than anything the organisations and the authorities collectively have addressed so far.</i>	
Partnership		
12.	What measures or means are DEC members/SwS partners taking to strengthen the capacity of local partners? What is enabling or constraining capacity development? Which partnership models show most promise?	
	<i>The organisations are using a variety of approaches to develop capacity. 1) Recruiting local staff – the capacity of new recruits is limited and there is some competition for staff between humanitarian organisations: 2) short training courses, using organisation specific training and manuals or shared materials, especially for the CHS, and 3. On the ground accompaniment and ‘learning by doing’ with more experience staff working alongside less experienced (seen as the most effective approach)</i> <i>At least one organisation is undertaking capacity development of capacity developers, with the intent that after withdrawal the capacity strengthening effort will have become sustainable. Short-term technical/training inputs from foreign experts may become more feasible if the Government relaxes restrictions on expatriates travelling to Palu after the national elections in April.</i>	
13.	To what extent has the localisation agenda been advanced in the response? What are the advantages and disadvantages of DEC members/SwS partners having limited access to their partners operations?	
	<i>There is a strong commitment, and awareness of the need, to advance localisation. To some extent this is just pragmatic. An effective Phase II response depends on having a strong local affiliate or delivery partner, so local capacity needs to be built up. Some organisations have a longer-term strategy for embedding local capacity and disaster preparedness in Sulawesi. The organisations feel they have been held back by foreign staff not having access to their local partners and affiliates and that programme quality and monitoring, in particular, have suffered as a result.</i>	

For their part, in the online survey, organisations rated their Phase I responses as ‘good’ overall, with the percentage for ‘very good’ slightly higher than for ‘fair’:



5.2 Summary assessment against the Core Humanitarian Standard

⁷⁸ For example, CARE Indonesia Rapid Gender Analysis Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami Indonesia, 31 October 2018

Table 2 below offers a summary assessment of DEC members and SwS partners alignment with the nine commitments⁷⁹ of the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS), generalised across the organisations. This should not be regarded as an in-depth performance assessment and organisations should look to their agency specific reviews and evaluations, some of which have been explicitly designed around the CHS.


Table 2: Summary assessment against the CHS commitments

CHS Commitment Fully met	CHS Commitment Partially met	CHS Commitment Not met
CHS Commitment/ Comments		
1.	Communities and people affected by crisis receive assistance appropriate and relevant to their needs.	
	<i>At the level of individual organisations, assistance appears to have been appropriate in meeting emergency needs, with efforts to reach the most vulnerable. Some communities did not receive the emergency relief they needed at all, and others not on time, sometimes due to factors outside the organisations' control.</i>	
2.	Communities and people affected by crisis have access to the humanitarian assistance they need at the right time.	
	<i>Some of the organisations mobilised quickly, others took time, and some are still mobilising because: 1) they had no local presence before the emergency, 2) local partners were hard to find or took time to mobilise, 3) government made uncoordinated and changing requests concerning where NGO assistance was needed most. Later evaluations will be needed to get a better fix on whether the scale and speed of the emergency response was adequate but the overall response took time to gather momentum. As discussed above, wider cash distribution has been delayed. Livelihoods support is under-developed as a sector.</i>	
3.	Communities and people affected by crisis are not negatively affected and are more prepared, resilient and less at-risk as a result of humanitarian action.	Not rated
	<i>Informants discussed examples of gaps and duplication in the provision of relief goods to some communities. This and delays in implementation will have had negative effects. For reasons largely outside the control of the DEC/SwS, there has been limited progress on transitional shelter and cash grants. Further evaluation will be needed to assess performance against commitment 3.</i>	
4.	Communities and people affected by crisis know their rights and entitlements, have access to information and participate in decisions that affect them.	
	<i>Fully met in terms of commitment to affected people being engaged in decision making, even if that engagement is not always fully realised in practice. (Whether people affected know their rights and entitlements is less clear).</i>	
5.	Communities and people affected by crisis have access to safe and responsive mechanisms to handle complaints.	
	<i>Fully met in terms of commitment. Most organisations already have or are implementing feedback and complaints mechanisms. Reflections in the survey point to the information gathered not being used consistently to drive decision-making.</i>	
6.	Communities and people affected by crisis receive coordinated, complementary assistance.	
	<i>Overall, coordination did not work well in the first 30 days. It has improved since, overall, but some clusters and working groups are much stronger than others. There are examples of organisations directly collaborating together and adjusting their locations in discussion with others to achieve best coverage. There is some way to go before organisations achieve a genuinely complementary response, working together to achieve maximum effect.</i>	
7.	Communities and people affected by crisis can expect delivery of improved assistance as organisations learn from experience and reflection.	
	<i>There was some evidence that organisations are reflecting on their experience and making adjustments to implementation accordingly. The DEC and SwS will need to wait for the Phase II proposals for months 7-24 to judge whether lessons are explicitly documented and used in their design.</i>	

⁷⁹ The full text of the CHS is available at: <https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/files/files/Core%20Humanitarian%20Standard%20-%20English.pdf>

8.	Communities and people affected by crisis receive the assistance they require from competent and well-managed staff and volunteers.	
<i>Several organisations have been able to deploy staff with substantial disaster management experience. However, both the local affiliates and local NGO partners have new staff and volunteers who need further training to become fully competent. Organisations are committed to achieving increased competence.</i>		
9.	Communities and people affected by crisis can expect that the organisations assisting them are managing resources effectively, efficiently and ethically.	Not rated
<i>The review was not designed to assess efficiency and effectiveness. First impressions are that organisations are working with genuine commitment to ethical standards, but the review has no information on lapses in ethical standards. This would need other instruments to assess.</i>		

Online survey respondents rated their implementation of the CHS and their partners' capacity to meet the CHS as 'Good' (See Annex 9).



6 Lessons identified from Phase 1

6.1 Humanitarian imperative and national leadership

Following the disaster, international humanitarian organisations launched a response that was not requested by the national government (beyond a request for specific relief items). The Government did not expect 300 NGOs to come to Palu and, understandably, had difficulty managing the influx. However, the value of the contribution of the NGOs is recognised by the provincial government. That some DEC/SwS organisations found the government restrictions on INGO activity so challenging may point to a lack of understanding of the national context and of the Indonesian regulations for disaster response that left them wrong-footed.

In the inception workshop, the question was raised as to whether INGOs had been too accepting of gaps in the overall response that meant that humanitarian principles were not fully applied. We did not hear of any DEC/SwS members taking up the limitations of the response with the Indonesian government at the Jakarta level (via the UN, or the UK, Swiss or EU missions, for example) or in the UK or Switzerland. This leaves open the question of how the DEC members or SwS partners, singly or in groups, can take up such issues with the Government in Phase II of this response, other than at local levels.⁸⁰

Given that future disasters in South East Asia may be managed in a similar fashion, that is, with strong control by government and limits on international engagement, the DEC/SwS organisation could usefully reflect on how well they understand the disaster risks and national response mechanisms in other disaster-prone countries of the region through risk monitoring and preparedness planning, including an assessment of the capacity of national and local partners to respond.

⁸⁰ The DEC Secretariat had an ongoing dialogue on the response with the Indonesian High Commission in London, via the British Embassy in Jakarta and directly through the UK Secretary of State, who visited Indonesia a couple of days after meeting with the DEC. DEC members did not request an intervention by the DEC secretariat concerning the restrictions placed on their response in Sulawesi.

Instead, NGOs could usefully reflect on how they can advocate for humanitarian principles. To be upheld in this type of operating context.

6.2 Localisation

The localisation agenda endorsed by the World Humanitarian Summit in 2016 called for support to local authority response capacity, as well as for more resources for humanitarian response to go to local authorities and NGOs. It was suggested during the review that, in principle, the strong leadership by the Government and reliance on local NGO actors is a good thing; this is the localisation agenda in action. However, this has pros and cons. On the one hand, having the response managed almost entirely by Indonesian personnel is viewed positively by the majority of our key informants. On the other hand, DEC/SwS project spending has been limited by the relatively low absorption capacity of local partners and because there are few experienced local partners available. There have been too many donors looking for too few competent local partners. There is therefore a trend towards under-spending.

Localisation has become an imperative in this response because there is no other way for DEC/SwS organisations to respond successfully. Several organisations are investing heavily in developing the capacity of national affiliates and local partners, recognising that their capacity is not adequate for responding to address the consequences of a disaster of this scale. Some of the organisations plan to continue these localisation investments for the period of the DEC and SwS funding and beyond. At the same time, DEC members and SwS partners are using various approaches to capacity development. Some key informants see Oxfam's support to JMK or 'knowledge hub', itself a capacity building consortium of local NGOs, as an innovative means to provide sustainable capacity support that could continue once Oxfam withdraws. Organisations will need to consult their organisational development colleagues in planning future capacity development initiatives, as humanitarian response staff do not typically have the in-depth skills required.

6.3 Maximising support for local authorities

The DEC/SwS organisations have learned from their Phase I experience that, for them to be successful in Phase II, the local authorities must be in a position to manage the response effectively. It is not clear how many NGOs the local authorities will have to deal with in Phase II. It is certainly fewer than the original 300 that responded but it will still be many. The local authorities are aware of the importance of the financial resources INGOs are bringing to meeting the needs of people affected by the disaster but they do not yet know what level of combined resources they can rely on or for what time period.

As long as the authorities have to deal with multiple NGOs individually, transaction costs for them will remain high, consuming valuable time and making them less efficient. It could be argued that by continuing to interact individually with government, NGOs are themselves driving inefficiency. How can DEC/SwS organisation make their interaction with local authorities more efficient? NGOs could take action more collectively and reduce the number of 'touch points' with government, which already happens to a degree through the clusters. Acting collectively, NGOs might also be more influential with the authorities. Planning and acting together would also boost effectiveness, as an integrated cross-sector approach to community rehabilitation would have much greater impact than multiple uncoordinated activities across sectors.

So far, at international level, INGOs have not worked out how to implement a collective approach or how such an approach might be led. It should be possible for a grouping of NGOs to join together to lead such an approach in each emergency. It is likely that some NGOs would not join such an initiative, unless local government obliged them to once it proved successful.

6.4 Funding

DEC/SwS organisations are concerned that their financial resources will not be adequate to meet the significant outstanding needs. There have been the usual frustrations of funding coming in short-term emergency response grants (3-6 months maximum), while the DEC and SwS funding has the potential for a longer time frame of up to two years. For the larger NGOs in the response, the DEC and SwS Phase I contributions have typically accounted for about 15% of their total budget (higher

for the smaller NGOs). The funding from the DEC and SwS, while not the major portion in most cases, is highly appreciated because it is flexible, is decided quickly, and does not require competition between the organisations to obtain.

Organisations are now in need of longer-term recovery funding, including for livelihoods programmes, and need to redeploy any remaining humanitarian funding to recovery needs where donor rules allow. The disaster is no longer a high priority for international donors, especially given Indonesia's upper middle-income status and presumed recovery management capacity. The longer it takes to get Phase II fully mobilised, the more overhead costs will eat into the budgets for the projects that can provide practical help.⁸¹ Whether organisations consider that they are over- or under-funded, it is important that they work to the same technical standards, based on broadly similar unit costs, to avoid conflicts arising from unequal support being provided to different communities.

6.5 *Tangible versus Intangible*

The focus on tangible systems and structures in the first three months of the response has meant limited attention to the less tangible issues of protection, women's participation, disabilities, youth engagement, and GBV; even if some DEC/SwS organisations and partners have been promoting these issues strongly. Early stages of emergency response typically focus on distributions, infrastructure and the provision of basic services. Only later do the more intangible issues of the special needs of vulnerable groups and less visible protection issues gain traction.

In this case, the major damage to physical infrastructure, including to housing, means that infrastructure will continue to be a major preoccupation for the next two years and beyond. Keeping culturally difficult issues, for example, disability, child marriage, or GBV high on the agenda of government departments may be challenging but the organisations see this as a priority for Phase II.

6.6 *Partnership arrangements and capacity*

The 21 organisations have various direct implementation and indirect partnership arrangements in place for the response. These arrangements all have implications for how their programmes are implemented. The range of DEC/SwS organisation partnership models in place at the beginning of the disaster response included:

- Those with established national affiliated organisations
- Those in the process of forming national affiliated organisations
- Those with existing local NGO partner(s)
- Those in search of local NGO partners

The nature of these partnerships was a determinant in the speed, scale and nature of each organisation's response. Aware of the relatively restricted role for INGOs envisaged in the evolving national regulatory framework for disaster management,⁸² over the past five years some INGOs have established national affiliates, including ActionAid, ADRA, Plan International, Save the Children, and World Vision (with CARE currently in process). Having legal status as local NGOs has given them the ability to implement directly, as a domestic NGO in the response in Sulawesi. The Indonesian Red Cross (PMI), in its role as auxiliary government, has been able to receive financial and technical support from the British and Swiss Red Cross Societies and the IFRC.

Organisations with local affiliates were relatively well placed by already having capacity in Sulawesi, or elsewhere in Indonesia. Few had sufficient capacity to respond to a major disaster in Sulawesi and have had to scale up significantly.⁸³ In this situation, the NGOs best placed to respond in the early days/weeks were:

- Those with established national affiliates and legal status as local NGOs;

⁸¹ The UN coordinated appeal was only 39% funded, at about \$19.7 million. However, this has been augmented by another \$28.4m for UNDP in a Rehabilitation and Reconstruction grant from the German government and KfW, which will run from 2019-2022 and provide funding for critical infrastructure and livelihoods.

⁸² built using the authorities' experience of responding to a sequence of major disasters, including the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004), the Nias earthquake (2005), the Yogyakarta earthquake (2006) and the Padang earthquake (2009)

⁸³ Save the Children Indonesia (YSTC) staffing has gone from 3 to 170 plus since September, through a combination of staff transfer and local recruitment.

- Those which already had a presence in the province (or were able to rapidly deploy staff from elsewhere in the country, or Indonesian staff from other countries);
- Those with a good knowledge of the local context;
- Those with contacts in the relevant government ministries.

Organisations without local presence have various partnership agreements, some of which predated the current emergency, and some of them new. The implementation of projects under new partnerships have been delayed by INGO due diligence on the local partners. In the inception workshop and in the survey, DEC/SwS organisations raised concerns about the low capacity of some local partners through which significant DEC and SwS funds are passing. DEC/SwS are implementing their response through a relatively small number of local actors, which makes them heavily dependent on their ability to perform and makes their on-going capacity building efforts all the more important.⁸⁴ The NGO ‘market-place’, has led to considerable INGO-NGO cross-connections. ActionAid, CAFOD, Oxfam and Tearfund all share implementation partners, while five DEC/SwS organisations have come together in a structured approach to give joint support to national NGO Yakkum.⁸⁵ How these various structures and partnerships perform in future will provide important learning for DEC members and SwS partners.

The DEC is considering launching an evaluation of partnership arrangements and the progress and nature of localisation, using this response as one of the case studies. The review supports this idea. The evaluation could helpfully consider whether and how the power relations between international and national NGOs have developed as a result of INGO initiatives to localise emergency response capacity.

7 Recommendations for Phase II

Most, but not all, organisations already have a relatively clear idea about their target sectors and geographic areas for Phase II. In the online survey, in which almost all the organisations took part, the most frequently cited priorities were: shelter, WASH, livelihoods support/recovery, and cash-based interventions, followed by education, protection, health and psychosocial support. Also mentioned severally were disaster risk reduction, and the cross-cutting issues of resilience, localisation and capacity building.

The recommendations below are intended to guide the DEC/SwS organisations’ teams in Sulawesi as they prepare their Phase II plans, and for their HQs as they review them. It is understood that organisations will implement only those recommendations most relevant to them, but collectively all recommendations should be covered. Readers are requested to make reference to the issues identified in Section 4 of the report when considering how to address the recommendations.

Recommendations for DEC/SwS organisations’ approach to Phase II

Recommendation 1: Anticipate the emerging operating context, including the limited capacity of local partners, evolving government requirements for NGOs, outstanding decisions on land zoning and relocation, and the risks that may arise from the April elections.

In particular, take into account:

- The current (often limited) implementing capacity of local partners.
- The proposed (but not yet decreed by government) levels of cash assistance to households with damaged properties, and the likelihood of further regulations for NGOs being issued by provincial authorities aimed at ensuring government-NGO alignment.
- The uncertainty regarding the relocation of populations who resided in high risk (or “red”) zones, who were often directly affected either by the tsunami or liquefaction and are among the most vulnerable.

⁸⁴ For example, the Yakkum Emergency Unit (YEU) is a local partner for Action Against Hunger, Age International, and Christian Aid.

⁸⁵ Action Against Hunger, Age International, CBM Switzerland, Christian Aid, Swiss Church Aid

- The likely move to further decentralization from a provincial to district or municipal level coordination and implementation (which NGOs seem to see as a positive development and which a few have already offered to support).
- The potential risks and impact of the coming national elections (on April 17), including possible implementation delays.

Recommendation 2: Coordinate capacity and resources to maximise, together, their support to provincial and district authorities through complementary offers of financial resources and technical expertise.

In more detail:

- Coordinate their capacity and resources with other organisations (including those funded by DEC/SwS) to meet the acute needs of the tens of thousands of people still affected by the injuries, damage, displacement, trauma, and loss of assets arising from the disaster.
- Achieve complementarity by maximising, together, their support to provincial and district authorities' successful coordination and implementation of recovery and reconstruction activities, on which the success of DEC and SwS implementation of Phase II depends.⁸⁶
- Make a combined offer of financial resources and technical expertise, tailored to each of the three districts affected, coordinated across sectors, not just within sectors.⁸⁷
- Agree with district authorities how NGOs can best support local planning and coordination.
- Clarify, as soon as possible, the duration of each organisation's commitment to the response, whether 6, 12, 18 months, or longer, so that others know what to expect from them.

Recommendation 3: In pursuit of localisation, combine DEC/SwS organisations' capacity development for local NGOs and support government authorities.

- Engage development experts from their own organisations, or partner with development NGOs, on longer-term interventions, such as livelihoods recovery to ensure that projects are sustainable.⁸⁸
- Use short-term missions (1-2 weeks) from national and international experts to provide capacity development for local organisations, as restrictions on access for expatriates to Palu are gradually relaxed. Organisations could make best use of such expertise to help several organisations at once, not just the sending agency.

Recommendations for priority actions in Phase II

Recommendation 4: Accelerate support to the construction of transitional shelters needed for households affected by the disaster but not provided for by the Government and determine whether and how to support government-built communal shelters.

Organisations should:

- Work closely with the Government and each other to gain clarity on guidelines, rules, engineering standards, permits, land zoning, funding levels and cash disbursement amounts and modalities.
- Promote shelters for the most vulnerable being constructed first.
- Continue their good practice in 'owner-driven' construction.
- Take environmental factors into account when selecting building materials, especially given the high levels of deforestation in Central Sulawesi (see Annex 12).

Organisations working on transitional shelter should determine:

⁸⁶ The focus at provincial level is with the Provincial Secretary on policy, decrees, and decisions in principle, and at district level on planning and implementation.

⁸⁷ To achieve this, NGOs may need a more deliberate but still informal coordination mechanism to ensure joint strategies/sharing of tasks are agreed before approaching the authorities.

⁸⁸ accepting there are limits to the levels of sustained capacity that can be developed in a 12-18 month time frame.

- The degree of variation in shelter design being used by various NGO/Red Cross projects that is workable/acceptable to avoid controversy arising between communities about the variations in design or the way that transitional shelter support is delivered.
- Agree on the level of conditionality and oversight that will be required for the construction of transitional shelters. How will oversight be undertaken? Will it be acceptable if a household decides that they will use part of the cash for another purpose?
- Determine whether, how, and to what extent they engage with the authorities to make the communal shelters liveable. (DEC members and SwS partners may choose different strategies but should maximise their joint contribution to individual and communal shelters.)

Recommendation 5: Revise Water Sanitation and Hygiene interventions to provide medium term solutions, moving away from water trucking and mobile toilet units as soon as feasible.

- Maintain water trucking in the short term for camps. Shelters located far from water sources may need wells or boreholes.
- Ensure women's participation in the design and siting of water points and latrines.
- Expand hygiene education in camps, communities and schools, building on the Phase I response.
- Agree on a design for toilets that is inclusive/accessible to all, separate for males and females.
- Include sustainable solid waste management and hygiene education in both IDP camps and temporary shelters.
- Provide technical support and training to local water management companies (PDAM's) at village and sub-district levels, on damage assessment, planning or priority repairs, identification of borehole sites, etc.

NGOs engaging with WASH in communal transitional shelters should:

- Make sure all shelters have functional toilets;
- Map unmet WASH needs, working with the shelter cluster, including sludge removal and drainage;
- Engage women and men in planning, decision-making and management, using focal points to facilitate communication.

Recommendation 6: Implement cash transfers at scale as soon as possible to maximise their potential for widespread positive impact for large numbers of affected people.

- DEC/SwS organisations should plan their cash-based assistance via the cash working group, combining unconditional multi-purpose grants (single or serial) and conditional grants (for, for example, for shelter construction) for maximum impact. (Vouchers may also be relevant for specific interventions, such as nutrition and young child feeding.)
- INGOs should negotiate with the Government how they can support longer term cash-based assistance based on vulnerability criteria going beyond the initial three months, given that livelihoods and household incomes will take months if not years, to recover, and that some survivors may find themselves trapped in poverty.

Recommendation 7: Initiate, or expand, livelihoods support projects to increase the household income of people affected by the disaster.

- Undertake an inter-agency livelihoods assessment.
- Use internal expertise on livelihoods, job creation, business coaching, marketing and finance (or partners or external experts) to ensure livelihoods projects are well designed and supported.
- Engage fully with the recently formed Livelihoods cluster.

Potential livelihoods activities include:

- Expanded cash for work for rehabilitation of irrigation canals (where readily repairable), community facilities and schools, or land clearance.

- Targeted self-employment activities, including livelihood start-up grants or packages to provide seed money to start or revive income-generating activities. This could apply to fishing, farming or small business.
- Livelihood start-up packages that include tools, small-scale equipment, inputs (such as seeds), training and technical assistance on, for example, sales and marketing.
- Alternative livelihood activities, such as sustainable aquaculture in both coastal and inland areas.

An environmental assessment should precede any new economic activity.

Recommendation 8: Scale up basic social services, to which many affected people do not have access, and mainstream protection into all sectors:

- Integrate gender perspectives more systematically, with a special emphasis on women and girls.
- Watch for, and address, new vulnerabilities of people moving into temporary shelters.
- Pay special attention to those in 'hard to reach' locations and those less likely to have a voice, including children, women, the aged, and people with disabilities.
- Areas for scaling up could include: child protection, women's participation, gender-based violence, child marriage, youth engagement, community participation, people with disabilities, and psychosocial support services, for which there are few service providers so far.⁸⁹

Sector priorities could include:

- For education: Investments in temporary learning spaces, school rehabilitation and reconstruction, and school furniture (chairs, desks, tables, whiteboards) are a priority, for 1,257 damaged schools; expansion of psychosocial support to both children and teachers; and, campaigns to curb dropout and promote advancement to secondary school, especially for girls, in coordination with the Department of Education.
- For health and nutrition: Support to pregnant mothers, reproductive health, infants and young children, and monitoring of nutritional status (with Department of Health), as public kitchens and food vouchers wind down.
- For protection: Expansion of GBV referral services, campaigns to delay marriages until the legal age of 18 (working with religious leaders and coordinated with the Department of Women's Empowerment), and the mainstreaming of protection services, including for children, the elderly and people with disabilities into the departments of Social Affairs, Health, Education and Planning, which may need support with policy development.

Recommendation 9: Pursue disaster risk reduction projects that will reduce loss of life and damage from future disasters.

Understanding that there may be limited funding remaining for DRR once other urgent, cash-intensive interventions have been budgeted for, DRR projects should:

- Specify the approach to be followed, encompassing one or more of: hazard risk assessment systems, early warning systems, community-based preparedness training, standby emergency surge arrangements, purchase and placement of contingency stocks, ensuring risk reduction appears in the school curriculum, etc. Ideally, organisations should agree together on how to cover these various strategies between them.
- Work with government ministries, development NGOs and community-based organisations from the start to ensure lasting impact beyond the timeframe of Phase II.

⁸⁹ Save the Children reports that it has PSS programmes and Action Against Hunger is intending to start one after the six-month mark.

Annex 1 – Schedule of workshop participants, key informant interviews, and site visits

Briefing workshop Wednesday, 16th January 2019

No	Name	Organisation	Title
1	Novanto Agus	Islamic Relief-KONSEPSI	PIC Central Sulawesi Response
2	Zul Ashfi M	Islamic Relief-PKPU	Humanitarian Coordinator
3	Sondang Maria Tambunan	Yayasan Sayangi Tunas Cilik	Awards & Compliance Manager
4	Karen Mac	Yayasan Sayangi Tunas Cilik	Deputy Team Leader PDQ
5	Yeeshu Shukla	Christian Aid	Regional Emergency Manager SE Asia
6	Rudy Pinem	Christian Aid	Emergency Program Manager
7	Yohanis Pakereng	Action Against Hunger	Country Director
8	Tiurma Pohan	Yakkum Emergency Unit	Program Manager
9	Yarid	IBU Foundation	Project Coordinator
10	Puspa Kartika	Caritas Switzerland	PM Relief
11	Leonilo Endoso	Tear Fund	Response Manager
12	Serena Suen	Tear Fund	Grant & Information Officer
13	Yusi Bidi	Adra Indonesia	Project Manager
14	Ardian Sigit	Yakkum Emergency Unit	Information & Communication
15	D. Karlo Purba	ADRA Switzerland	Program Director
16	Anastasia Maylinda	Yakkum Emergency Unit	Response Manager
17	Hening Purwati	HEKS/EPER	Liaison Officer
18	Sari Mutia Timur	Yakkum Emergency Unit	Director
19	Natalia CAW	Yakkum Emergency Unit	Program Manager
20	Marion Stavalsa	Helpage International	Humanitarian Inclusion Manager
21	Fadhillah Hanum	Helpage International	Humanitarian Coordinator
22	Yacobus R	Wahana Visi Indonesia	Response Manager
23	Andreas Suwito	Wahana Visi Indonesia	Project Manager
24	Sigid Cahyono	Wahana Visi Indonesia	WASH Specialist
25	Carl Adams	Medair	Team Lead
26	Meghan North	Medair	Project Coordinator-ERT
27	M. Jawad	PKPU-Human Initiative	Project Manager
28	Alfred Anakotta	CARE	Program Manager
29	Adhong Syahri Ramadhan	CRS	ER Coordinator
30	Theresia Kinanti Dewi	CRS	MEAL Officer
31	Dino Argianto	OXFAM	Ops Lead
32	Ancilla Bepe	OXFAM	Program Coordinator
33	Agatha Tambunan	Yappika-Action Aid	Communication Officer
34	Wawan Probo Sulisty	Yappika-Action Aid	Program Coordinator
35	Hari Wijayanto	Yappika-Action Aid	Field Officer
36	Qaswar Abbas	IFRC	Relief Coordinator
37	Moushami	IFRC	PMER

Wednesday, 23rd January 2019 / In-country learning workshop

1	Rayendra Tayeb	Action Against Hunger	CLR Manager
2	Tiurma Pohan	YAKKUM	Program Manager – YEU ACF program
3	Agatha Roulina Tambunan	YAPPIKA-ActionAid	Communications Coordinator
4	Probo Wawan	YAPPIKA-ActionAid	Programme Coordinator
5	Clare Blesdele	Action Aid UK	Humanitarian Officer
6	D Karlo Purba	ADRA Indonesia	Program Director
7	Yosephine Bidi	ADRA Indonesia	Project Manager
8	Marion Stauton	HelpAge International	Humanitarian Inclusion Manager
9	Fadillah Hanum	HelpAge International	Humanitarian Coordinator
10	Qaswar Abbas	IFRC	Relief Coordinator
11	Moushomi Choundhury	IFRC	PMER Delegate
12	Theresia Kinanti Dewi	CRS	MEAL Officer
13	Alfred Anakotta	CARE	Program Manager
14	Muhammad Jawad	PKPU	Project Manager

15	Puspa Kartika	Caritas Switzerland	Project Manager - Relief
16	Patricia Kroell	Caritas Switzerland	PD Indonesia
17	Thamrin Tanty	CBM Indonesia	Humanitarian Program Manager
18	Marisa Kristianah	CBM Indonesia	Country Director
19	Carolus Rudy Pinem	Christian Aid	Emergency Programme Manager
20	Natalia CA	YAKKUM	Program Manager
21	Pascal Panosetti	HEKS	Emergency Coordinator Indonesia
22	Hening Purwati	YEU-EPER	Liaison Officer
23	Anastasia MT	YEU	Response Manager
24	Sari MT	YEU-DEC-SwS	Director
25	Novanto Agus	Islamic Relief	Program Manager
26	Nanang SD	Islamic Relief	Country Director
27	Meghan North	MEDAIR	ER Project Coordinator
28	Mona Saroinsong	YBT	Programme Manager
29	Dino Argianto	Oxfam	Operational Lead, Humanitarian Response, Sulawesi
30	Ancilla Bere	Oxfam	Indonesia Humanitarian Lead
31	Bagus	Oxfam	WASH coordinator
32	Karen MacRandal	Save the Children	DTL PDQ
33	Agnes Patongloan	Arbeiter Samariter Bund	Project Manager
34	Sam Lukas	Arbeiter Samariter Bund	MEAL Officer
35	Yudha	Solidar	ERA
36	Serena Suen	Tearfund	Grant & Info Officer
37	Sanjeen Bhanja	Tearfund	Humanitarian Lead
38	Novita Lenalatu	Feed the Hungry Indonesia	Program Manager

Interviews (post inception phase)

Monday, 14th January 2019/ Interview with UN OCHA			
1	Oliver Lacey-Hall	UNOCHA	Head of Office, Indonesia
2	Titi Moektijasih	UNOCHA	Humanitarian Affairs Analyst
Wednesday, 16th January 2019/ Interview with Action Aid			
1	Wawan Probo Sulistyto	Yappika-Action Aid	ER Program Coordinator-PASIGALA
2	Agatha Tambunan	Yappika-Action Aid	Communication Officer
3	Paresh	Yappika-Action Aid	Advisor
Wednesday, 16th January 2019/ Interview with ADRA Switzerland			
1	D. Karlo Purba	ADRA Switzerland	Program Director
2	Yusi Bidi	ADRA Switzerland	
3	Caroline Mangowal	RISE	Director
Wednesday, 16th January 2019/ Interview with Wahana Visi Indonesia			
1	Andreas Suwito	Wahana Visi Indonesia	Project Manager
2	Yacobus R	Wahana Visi Indonesia	Response Manager
3	Sigid Cahyono	Wahana Visi Indonesia	WASH Specialist
4	Niken Utami	Wahana Visi Indonesia	Program Officer
Wednesday, 16th January 2019/ Interview with CAFOD / CRS			
1	Adhong Syahri Ramadhan	CRS	Emergency Response Coordinator
2	Joona		
3	Theresia Kinanti Dewi		
Thursday, 17th January 2019/ Interview with Yayasan Plan International			
1	Dheni Surya Ardhian	Yayasan Plan International	Cash Transfer Coordinator
Thursday, 17th January 2019/ Interview with IFRC			
1	Michael Gloekcle	IFRC	FACT team leader
2	Qaswar Abbas	IFRC	Relief Coordinator
Thursday, 17th January 2019/ Interview with Age International/Help Age			
1	Natalia Christinawati		Program Manager
2	Fadhillah Hanum	Helpage International	Humanitarian Coordinator
3	Anastasia Maylinda	Yakkum Emergency Unit	Response Manager
Thursday, 17th January 2019/ Interview with Christian Aid			
1	Sari		
2	Rudy Pinem	Christian Aid	Emergency Program Manager

3	Ardian		
Thursday, 17th January 2019/ Interview with HEKS			
1	Natalia CAW	Yakkum Emergency Unit	Program Manager
Thursday, 17th January 2019/ Interview with Action Against Hunger			
1	Yohanes	Action Against Hunger	Country Coordinator-Asia
2	Tiurma Pohan	YEU	
3	Sari MT	YEU	Director
Thursday, 17th January 2019/ Interview with Bappeda			
1	Arfan	Bappeda Province	Head
2	Rizal	Bappeda Province	Chief of Economic Bureau
3	Ibnu	Bappeda Province	Data management
4	Dian	Bappeda Province	Data management
Thursday, 17th January 2019/ Interview with Islamic Relief			
1	Novanto Agus	Islamic Relief-KONSEPSI	PIC Central Sulawesi Response
2	Zul Ashfi		Humanitarian Coordinator
3	Dzikri Insan		SO Protection & Inclusion
4	Abdul Muiz	KONSEPSI	KONSEPSI
5	Wahyudin		Logistic
Thursday, 17th January 2019/ Interview with Sulteng Bergerak			
1	Agatha Roulina Tambunan	Action Aid - Yappika	Communication Officer
2	Dony	Sulteng Bergerak	Coordinator
3	Dimas	Sulteng Bergerak	Communication & Engagement Officer
Thursday, 17th January 2019/ Interview with UNDP			
1	Wisnu Yonar Anggono	UNDP	Program Coordinator
2	Agatia Wenan Tyawati	UNDP	Government and Partners Liaison Officer
3	Olyvianus MP Dadi Lado	UNDP	Communication and Reporting Associate
Friday, 18th January 2019/ Interview with BPPD Province – Storage and Logistic Unit			
1	Fera	BPPD Province	Storage Coordinator
Friday, 18th January 2019/ Interview with Dinsos (Social Affairs Office) Province			
1	Ridwan Mumu	Dinsos	Head
2	Abdul Rahim	Dinsos	Data Management Officer
Friday, 18th January 2019/ Interview with ECHO			
1	Roman Majcher	ECHO	Humanitarian Expert for East, South East Asia and the Pacific
Monday, 4th February 2019/ Interview with CARE Indonesia			
1	Alexander Kassenberg	CARE	Response Director
2	Kristen Zbikowski	CARE	Emergency Response Specialist - Program Development and Quality
Monday, 4th February 2019/ World Vision Indonesia – Wahana Visi			
1	Margarettha Siregar	WVI	Response Director
2	Masrawati Sinaga	WVI	International Resource Acquisition Manager
3	Puspasari Indra	WVI	Cash/Market Based Programming Advisor, Palu
4	Andreas Suwito	WVI	DEC Project Manager
5	Nicola Hannigan	WVUK	

Site Visits

Friday, 18th January 2019/ Field visit with HEKS includes HelpAge, CBM, Christian Aid, ACF, YAKKUM: See water treatment, solar panel, treatment package for people with disability, shelter			
1	Hening	HEKS/EPER	Liaison Officer
2	Anastasia Maylinda	Yakkum Emergency Unit	Response Manager
Saturday, 19th January 2019/ Site visit with Islamic Relief: See skyhidrant, individual shelter, shelter kit, temporary learning class, child friendly space, psychosocial, livelihood women group FGD in Lolu and Sigibromaru			
1	Novanto Agus	Islamic Relief-KONSEPSI	PIC Central Sulawesi Response
2	Zul Ashfi		Humanitarian Coordinator
3	Dzikri Insan		SO Protection & Inclusion
4	Abdul Muiz	KONSEPSI	KONSEPSI
5	Wahyudin		Logistic

Saturday, 19th January 2019/ Presentation at OXFAM – JMK office and site visit to project location: Cash transfers, WASH, Protection, Innovative model for supporting a group of local NGOs and show case on localising partnership for emergency responses			
1	Dino Argianto	OXFAM	Operational Lead for Humanitarian Response in Sulawesi
2	Ancilla Bere	OXFAM	Indonesia Humanitarian Lead
3	Safri Met	JMK-Jemari Sakato	Director
4	Sanusi	JMK-Suar Kediri	Director
5	Martha	JMK-PKPA	Child protection officer
6	Sholeh	JMK-PKPA	Protection
Saturday, 19th January 2019/ Site visit with Action Aid-YAPPIKA: FGD with women on safe spaces, GBV awareness, accountability in Lake Tawaeli Palu			
1	Agatha Tambunan	Yappika-Action Aid	Communication Officer
2	Samsidar	Rumah Samporda Mombine	Focal Point/child assistant
3	Wulan	Rumah Samporda Mombine	Staff
4	Risnawati	Rumah Samporda Mombine	Director
5	Sumarni	Rumah Samporda Mombine	Focal Point/child assistant
6	Murni	Rumah Samporda Mombine	Focal Point/child assistant
7	Dede Bintoro	RW 07 (Sub sub sub village in Lake Tawaeli)	Head
Sunday, 20th January 2019/ Site visit with Tearfund, Medair, Yayasan Bumi Tangguh (YBT): FGD with the community on hygiene promotion in Balongga Village South Dolo Sigi			
1	Mona Saroinsong	World Renew	Program Manager
2	Abu Bakar	Balongga Village	Head
3	Harun	Village Health Facility (Puskesmas)	Officer
4	Andini, Wahda, Nur, Elsandi	YBT	Hygiene promotion team
	Deni, Edwin	YBT	CO
	Iyan Selvia	Puskesmas South Dolo	Public health staff
	Moh Farid	Sub village 1	Head
	Suaib	Sub village 2	Head
	Sarmada, Simae, Bona, Feri, Anto, Carla	Balongga Village	Hygiene promotion cadre Community rep.
Sunday-Monday, 20th – 21st January 2019/ Site visit with Save the Children – Yayasan Sayangi Tunas Cilik (YSTC): FGD with adolescence, Temporary Learning Space, and Child Friendly Space in North Donggala			
1	Karen MacRandal	STC	DTL PDQ
2	Andi Dyer	YSTC	Field Manager, North Donggala
3	Hari Santoso	YSTC	Education Coordinator
4	Wiwit Sri Arianti	YSTC	Child Protection Manager
5	Budi Maryono	YSTC	FSL Programme Manager
6	Jamal, Mery, Amani, Masran, Yuslan, Sahlan,	Village V Balaesang,	Adolescence beneficiaries
7	Idris, Guimanto, Julia, Asli	SDN 5 Balaesang Tanjung	Teachers
Monday, 21st January 2019/ Interview with Head of BPPD Province			
1	Bartolomeus	BPPD Province	Head
Monday, 21st January 2019/ Interview UNFPA			
1	Dinah Soka Handinah	UNFPA	Women's right protection coordinator
Monday, 21st January 2019/ Interview with UNICEF			
1	Ali Aulia Ramly	UNICEF	OIC and Child Protection Specialist
Monday, 21st January 2019/ Interview with CBM Switzerland			
1	Tanty Thamrin	CBM Switzerland	Humanitarian Project Manager
2	Kristianah Marisa	CBM Switzerland	Country Director

Summary of interviews and group meetings by type and number

Type		Staff	Partners	Total
Key Informant Interviews				
1. Member Organisations				
1.1 DEC members				
	ActionAid (Yappika)	3	0	3
	Action Against Hunger	1	2	3

		Age International/ HelpAge	2	1	3
		CAFOD – CRS	1	2	3
		CARE International	2	0	2
		Christian Aid	1	1	2
		Islamic Relief	3	2	5
		Plan Indonesia	1	0	1
		World Vision	4	0	4
		8 DEC exclusive members	18	8	27
1.2	SwS partners				
		ADRA Switzerland	2	1	3
		HEKS/ABS	1	1	2
		2 SwS exclusive partners	3	2	5
1.3	Mutual DEC-SwS				
		IFRC	3	0	3
		Save the Children (YSTC)	5	0	5
		2 mutual organisations	8		8
2.	UN				
		UNDP	3		3
		UNFPA	4		4
		UNICEF	1		1
		UNOCHA	2		2
		4 interviews	10		10
3.	Government				
		Bappeda – Provincial	4		4
		BPBD Province -Logistics	1		1
		BPBD Province – Chief	1		1
		MoSA- Dinsos	2		2
		4 interviews	8		8
4.	Children				
	SDN Lolo (primary school)	Nabil (m), age 10	1		1
		Riski (f), age 11	1		1
	Group Interviews		Participants	Staff & Others	Total
1	Sulteng Bergerak	NGO Forum	4		4
2	Lolu Village, Sigi	Women’s Group	14	2	16
3	SDN 2, Biromaru, Sigi	4 th -6 th grade children	9	1	10
4	Kadongo Village, Palu	Women’s Group	3	5	8
5	Hygiene promotion group	World Renew	1	2	3
			31	10	41

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Annex 3 – DEC Members/ Swiss Solidarity partners funding and activities, Phase I

Organization	Primary Sectors	Main Activities – Phase I Plans	Planned Locations & Beneficiaries	Budget
1.DEC Members - Phase I Budgets				GBP
Action Against Hunger/Yakkum Emergency Unit (YEU) (local foundation)	WASH Nutrition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hygiene kit distribution Access to clean water Community kitchens for IYCF 	4,153 beneficiaries - 10 sites, 1000 households, (Donggala, Sigi, Palu)	370,800
Action Aid/ YAA (local foundation)	Protection Livelihoods Food	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Women-friendly spaces and protection services Livelihood kickstarting Emergency food for vulnerable 	17,747 beneficiaries incl. 2,850 livelihood & 600 WFS participants (Donggala, Sigi Palu)	389,500
Age/ Yakkum Emergency Unit (YEU)	WASH Health NFI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Water purifiers and mosquito nets to households Essential health services and health facility repair Protection of OP and PLWD 	15,000 Older People (OP), People with Disabilities in Sigi, Donggala & Palu	194,469
BRC/ PMI (Indonesian Red Cross) /IFRC	WASH NFI Shelter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Distribution of hygiene kits Operation of water trucks Emergency shelter for 5,000 households 10,000 blankets 3000 tarpaulins 	20,645 in Donggala, Sigi, Palu, including 5000 households for emergency shelter and 4129 households for clean water and hygiene	664,943
CAFOD/ Karina (Caritas Intl), CRS/ MDMC	Shelter WASH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cash transfers for transitional shelter and for sanitation 	1,230 (300 households) in Sigi, with possible expansion to Donggala and Palu	346,826
CARE/ Yayasan PKPU	Shelter WASH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emergency family hygiene kits Emergency shelter kits and cash transfers Family kitchen kits Latrine construction Water point repair 	6,300 in Donggala	288,371
Christian Aid/ YEU/YAKKUM	Shelter WASH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1,200 emergency shelter kits, solar panels 6,000 hygiene kits 24 toilets Mobile health units with OB/Gyn - midwife 	13,840 with 6000 individuals – shelter; 2,880 mobile health services, in Palu	399,138
Islamic Relief/ Yayasan PKPU	Shelter Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 125 transitional family shelters 20 temporary learning centres 	1,200 in Sigi (125 families and approximately 700 students)	170,308
Oxfam/ 12 national agencies through consortia	WASH Cash Transfers Protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Water purification systems 90 domestic water tanks 400 latrines 30 water points 12 safe spaces for women Cash transfers for 2,800 individuals, 	29,000 in Palu, Donggala and Sigi including 8000 households and 2,800 individuals for cash transfers	883,325

		primarily cash for work		
Plan UK/ YPII and Yayasan Rebana	Education NFI WASH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 temporary learning centres • 30 latrines at TLCs • 1,000 school kits • 1,000 hygiene kits • 500 MHM kits 	6,400 in Palu	354,202
Save the Children/ YSTC (direct implementation)	Cash Transfers Education Nutrition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6,000 cash grants • Community-led recovery efforts • 50 temporary learning centres • Fresh food vouchers, kitchen gardens 	24,000 in Palu and Donggala	1,521,038
Tearfund	Cash Transfers Livelihoods Food WASH Shelter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cash transfers to 600 IDPs in So. Sulawesi • 250 HH hygiene kits • 400 HH kits • 10 water points rehab • 20 latrines • 400 shelter kits 	8,400 in Palu, Donggala and Sigi Cash transfers to 600 IDPs in South Sulawesi	525,921
World Vision/ Wahana Visi (local affiliate)	Education WASH Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 7,000 school kits • 1,600 hygiene kits • 30 latrines and hand-washing facilities • Health promotion 	8,000 in Sigi (6 districts) and Donggala (2 districts)	379,233
2. SWS Partners - Phase I project approvals				CHF
ADRA/ ADRA Indonesia	Shelter Livelihoods NFI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cash transfers for necessities • Cash transfers for temporary shelter • Cash transfers for livelihood assets 	800 individuals (372 households) living in shifting camps	286,455
CARITAS/IBU Foundation/CACH	WASH Protection NFI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2,000 family kits for urgent non-food and hygiene • 2,000 water filters • 10 child friendly spaces • Psychosocial support • Hygiene promotion 	8,000 individuals (2,000 families) in Sigi (3 districts)	300,000
CBM/ YEU Foundation (Yakkum)	Health WASH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mobile health clinic for 5 villages for treatment, referral, physiotherapy and prosthetic devices • 500 hygiene kits • Awareness raising on disabilities 	2,040 individuals in Palu and Sigi (5 villages)	137,053
EPER/HEKS/ YEU Foundation (Yakkum)	Shelter Hygiene	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shelter kits for 3,300 households (tarpaulins, mattresses, plywood etc.) • Hygiene kits for 3,300 households 	13,200 individuals (3300 households) in Palu, Donggala, Sigi and Pariji Moulong	300,000
MEDAIR/ Map Indonesia; YBT, CFK, IFT (local NGOs)	Shelter WASH NFI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 524 emergency shelter kits • 4'069 hygiene kits • 524 NFI emergency kits 	16'093 individuals in Donggala, Sigi and Palu	300,000
Save the Children/YSTC (local affiliate)	Shelter Protection NFI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1,790 emergency shelter kits • 1,750 hygiene kits 	8,950 individuals In Donggala and Palu	295,198

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1,000 child hygiene kits • 10 Child Friendly Spaces with kits 		
SOLIDAR/ ASB/ 5 local DPOs	WASH	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 20 universal skyhydrants • 100 universal latrines • 1,250 hygiene kits 	10,000 individuals (2000 households) in 20 villages in Palu, Donggala and Sigi	299,993
Swiss Red Cross/ Indonesian Red Cross (PMI)	WASH Health Shelter Livelihoods	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safe Water • Hygiene • Household NFIs • Emergency shelter • Livelihoods Recovery (needs a logframe) 	80,000 individuals (20,000 families) In Palu, Donggala and Sigi	300,000

Annex 4 - Chronology of Key Events – Sulawesi Earthquake and Tsunami

1.	28 Sept	7.5 magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsunami of 4-7 metres strikes Palu, Donggala and Mamuju
2.	29 Sept	Search and Rescue Phase launched, state of emergency declared for 14 days, later extended to Oct 26
3.	1 Oct	Indonesia welcomes international assistance and receives bilateral and in-kind assistance and commitments from 15 countries over the coming days
4.	1 Oct	Government-led response initiated, supported by NGOs, the Red Cross and UN agencies
5.	1 Oct	Victims' bodies start to be buried in mass graves
6.	October	Cluster system activated, and secretariats established
7.	October	Immediate relief phase commences with airlifts of key equipment and relief supplies from Balikpapan, Kalimantan, with donations from 15 countries
8.	October	Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) system activated
9.	2-8 Oct	Joint Needs Assessment by 12-person team conducted in Sulawesi, led by the Humanitarian Forum Indonesia and its 15-member faith-based organisations, including key DEC partners and members
10.	2-17 Oct	Technical assessments launched in key sectors, such as Logistics, WASH, Infrastructure, Education, Protection, Economic Impact, etc.
11.	3 Oct	CERF funds of US\$15 million released to kickstart UN and, via the UN, major NGO response
12.	4 Oct	The DEC Tsunami Appeal launched and raises £17 million in its first two weeks
13.	5 Oct	Humanitarian Country Team Sulawesi Earthquake Response Plan published seeking resources of US\$50.5 m (HCT Indonesia/UNOCHA)
14.	6 Oct	Swiss Solidarity Appeal launched, raising CHF10.5 in October (£8 million)
15.	11 Oct	Search and Rescue phase ended
16.	14 Oct	World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB) pledge US\$1 billion each in loan funding to GoI to support disaster recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction in Lombok, NTT, and Palu, Central Sulawesi
17.	Mid-Oct	Coordination structures at provincial level being strengthened through line ministries to support inter-cluster coordination under the leadership of the Provincial Secretary (SEKDA). The local government was also decreed responsible to lead recovery and reconstruction efforts with continued national support from BNPB, key line ministries and member agencies of the early recovery cluster.
18.	26 Oct	Immediate Relief Phase ended by GoI, with the closure of an air-bridge from Balikpapan
19.	31 Oct	Submission Date for Phase One Proposals/DEC
20.	12 Nov	Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) launched which will provide data for the master plan for recovery (Bappenas w/ support from JICA, WB, and ADB.)
21.	14 Nov	Cash-for-Work Programme launched by C. Sulawesi Government
22.	16 Nov	Information and Data Harmonisation Meeting Held. Pustadina formed as new centre for data management at provincial level.
23.	16 Nov	Latest Humanitarian Country Team Report published – Sitrep 8
24.	3 Dec	Shelter standards announced by C. Sulawesi Government
25.	14 Dec	Inception workshop held DEC London, with remote connections to Indonesia/Switzerland
26.	22 Dec	Land zoning classifications announced by C Sulawesi Government
27.	31 Dec	WFP phases out of Sulawesi
28.	15 Jan	9-day Rapid Review conducted in Central Sulawesi
29.	15 Jan	UNOCHA phases out of Sulawesi after final Humanitarian Team Report published on January 12
30.	23 Feb	End of GoI Emergency Transitional Phase

DEC INDONESIA TSUNAMI APPEAL

DEC FUNDRAISING APPEAL

DEC launched its appeal on 4 Oct 18 and the collective campaign has raised £25.6m to date.

£18.9m raised directly by DEC £6.7m raised by member agencies

£12m allocated to date

£6.4m budgeted for first 6 months

From the moment that the disaster struck, national affiliates of DEC member charities and their partners were in Sulawesi or provided surge support from other locations in Indonesia.

£6.4M budgeted between Oct 18 - Mar 19 will be prioritised towards providing affected communities with:

- shelter
- water, sanitation and hygiene support
- cash assistance to help address both immediate relief needs of vulnerable families and early recovery at community level
- food and nutrition
- health
- education and protection

PLANS FOR DEC FUNDS

6,900 families are to receive emergency shelters (tarpaulin, ropes, plywood, hammer, nails, and sleeping mats)

10,000 families are to have access to safe drinking water through water trucking and the distribution of household water filters

3,000 heads of household are to receive equipment and training in income generating activities linked to fishing, agriculture and small-scale trading

8,000 children between 5 to 16 years of age are to receive school kits containing school bag, books, pencil, sharpener, eraser, pens, ruler

9,400 families are to have access to unconditional cash support



Masitar and her son Mohammad, have received food, sleeping mats and blankets from a DEC member agency

OCTOBER 18 -



2,200 families are to have their food 2 - 3 months

840 people are to receive targeted nutrition requirements 5 and pregnant and lactating

11,000 people are to have access to health care with support from DEC appeal funds

22,000 people are to be targeted with support on gender-based violence

Strengthening the capacity of local communities to respond to future disasters is observed across the region.

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tearfund

Infographic designed in collaboration with Action Against Hunger UK's Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning

INDONESIA TSUNAMI APPEAL

7.4M EARTHQUAKE
28 SEPT 2018, 17:02 LOCAL TIME
3-6 METRE HIGH TSUNAMI

IMPACT (as of end Nov 18)

- 133,631 people**
still displaced and thousands more have left the province or found refuge with host families
- 2,101 people**
confirmed dead
- 4,438 people**
seriously injured
- 1,373 people**
missing
- 35,000 families**
require emergency shelter support

FUNDING

£910m
BNPB (National Agency for Disaster Management, Indonesia) total damage estimate

SITUATION OVERVIEW

- On 28 September, a series of earthquakes struck Indonesia's Central Sulawesi province, the strongest a 7.4 magnitude earthquake only 10 km deep with its epicentre close to the provincial capital, Palu.
- The earthquake triggered a tsunami striking beaches in Palu and Donggala. The earthquakes, tsunami and resulting liquefaction and landslides caused significant damage and loss of life.
- The government-led response continues to cover humanitarian needs while transitioning into the recovery phase.
- 15,000 houses and land have been totally devastated. Some 17,000 houses are heavily destroyed but the sites may allow for reconstruction.
- The UN, Red Cross and NGOs, including DEC member charities and their partners are supporting the Government's priorities and efforts.
- While the focus to date has been on emergency relief, recovery planning is well underway with several related assessments in process.



A view of the devastation caused by the earthquake and tsunami in Palu, Indonesia.

Earthquake Epicenter


Population by Intensity Level (worldpop 2020)

- 8 - 48,827 ppl
- 7 - 122,438 ppl
- 6 - 508,817 ppl
- 5 - 564,105 ppl
- 4 - 1,257,636 ppl

▭ Kabkot (Admin 2)
• Main town

Data source: Administrative boundaries: OCHA; Population: WorldPop 2020; Intensity Level: USGS; Coordinate System: GCS WGS 1984; Contact: reach.remap@spacenet.com; Note: Data, descriptions and boundaries contained on this map are not warranted to be accurate and do not imply acceptance by the PEACU partners, associates, donors mentioned on the map.

0 10 20 30 Kms



Map: Population by intensity level of 28/09/18 Indonesia Earthquake

A second allocation of DEC funds will be made in January 2019, which will be added to the balance from the first allocation to help the people of Sulawesi rebuild their lives over a 2-year period.

DEC-funded activities will continue until September 2020.



Viola outside a learning space

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World Vision

Infographic designed in collaboration with Action Against Hunger, UK's Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Service

Annex 5 – DEC and SwS Funding Guidelines and Priorities

DEC and SwS responses are both divided into two phases:

- Phase One: an immediate humanitarian response, designed to meet high priority, basic human needs and alleviate suffering, with a duration of up to six months, and,
- Phase Two: a recovery and reconstruction phase, with an additional duration of up to 18 months.


DEC Funding criteria are as follows:

DEC Funding Guidelines		
	Phase I 6 months	Phase II 7 – 24 months
Scope	Funds are for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Immediate emergency response activities • Humanitarian relief • Rapid impact livelihoods support. • Emergency shelter • Early stages of recovery and reconstruction where appropriate 	Funds are for recovery and reconstruction: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Continuation of relief activities if necessary • Livelihoods recovery programmes • Core shelter construction • Consolidation of investments made during Phase II • Ensuring that local capacity is strengthened to withstand future crisis [including partner capacity] • Conflict mitigation • Rehabilitation of community structures

SwS funding priorities for Phase I are as follows:

Swiss Solidarity's Emergency Response Phase One Priority Activities	
•	Accommodation and non-food items: distribution of tents and materials to build temporary accommodation and address basic needs such as equipping survivors: mattresses, blankets, hygiene kits, cooking materials, clothes, torches. All or part of this aid is directed toward the distribution of exchange vouchers or prepaid cards to enable families to purchase what they need when local markets begin to obtain supplies again and families have access to them.
•	Drinking water: installation of systems for filtering, purifying, transporting and distributing water, as well as tools and instruments for repairing damaged water networks and pumps.
•	Hygiene: installation of health services, particularly in areas where displaced families live.
•	Medical assistance: direct support to health centres and hospitals, particularly for people with disabilities.
•	Education and spaces for children: creation of protected recreational and educational spaces for children. Organisations set up tents and have educational materials, toys, books, coloured pencils, etc. Parents can thus be sure that their children are safe when they themselves devote themselves to other occupations in this post-emergency situation. These spaces also allow the identification of separated or unaccompanied children and the reunification of families.

Annex 6 – Cluster Coordination Structures



Annex 7 – Government of Indonesia Regulations for International NGOs

Graphic taken from the ASEAN's AHA Centre Situation Update 13, October 19 2018, p4⁹⁰

Regulations for International NGOs aim to provide assistance in Central Sulawesi

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Foreign NGOs are not allowed to go directly to the field. All activities must be conducted in partnership with local partners. 2. Foreign citizens who are working with foreign NGOs are not allowed to conduct any activity on the sites affected by disasters <p style="font-size: small; margin: 5px 0;">Foreign NGOs who already procured/prepared relief items in Indonesia need to register their assistance with the relevant ministries/agencies & mandated to work with local partners in distributing the aid.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 3. If the respective NGOs have not registered their assistance with the relevant ministries/agencies, they are asked to register with BNPB for the distribution to the affected population on the field. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 4. Foreign NGOs wishing to provide aid can do so through the Indonesian Red Cross (PM) or PMI's - with the guidance of the related ministries/agencies or local partners. 5. Foreign NGOs who have deployed its foreign personnel are advised to recall their personnel immediately. 6. A monitoring of foreign volunteers is required. 7. The delivery of relief items are being coordinated temporarily by BNPB through Balikpapan.
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National Disaster Management Authority **BNPB**

Figure 2 Conditions for International NGOs providing assistance in Central Sulawesi

⁹⁰ https://ahacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/AHA-Situation_Update-no13-Sulawesi-EQ.pdf

Annex 8 – Outcome of the Real Time Review Learning Workshop

Held in Palu on morning of January 23, 2019

Validation of Lessons Learned, Best Practices and Challenges (plenary discussion)

- Modality of response is unclear. Govt asked for 6 items initially. Did we over-respond? Pressure from headquarters to deploy (Islamic Relief) (tension between what gov't asked for and what headquarters wanted to do).
- Experts were not permitted to enter, even though they were on standby, for some INGOs
- Made us timid about going to field, hampered response
- Presentation reflected many things that we were feeling
- On issues like livelihood, it is difficult to know how to partner with
- How to know how provincial response will be translated at district level
- Lack of clarity on transfer of leadership from the national level to the provincial and district level – still unclear as to who is taking the lead within the decentralization context
- City and district levels are not so familiar with the cluster system – creates confusion for them
- Do we have a humanitarian response plan issued by the government – 2008 law as to when things are declared a national disaster, but Sulawesi is still ambiguous – not really a national disaster – this has created confusion – it is more provincial
- HR – difficult to recruit sufficient skilled staff especially within context (some organisations may be “robbing”) YSTC has 172 staff (up from 3)
- Some the needs from early relief phase still exist – discussion of livelihoods, lack of clarity
- Ongoing needs to address psychosocial services, people are still very traumatized
- Some programs, for example, CfW, need to incorporate psychosocial elements
- Huge increase in recruiting new staff – those who are qualified and willing to do this work, then time to train them adequately, many have been traumatized and have done exceptional work considering, but it is an ongoing factor
- Have we captured community knowledge and preparedness to deal with another earthquake and/or disaster?
- Adequate policies at national and district level but in terms of being rolled out, there is often limited understanding on the ground
- Government budgets for rehabilitation and reconstruction will be delayed from this year until 2020 – only BPBD can implement – implementation follows planning
- UNOCHA system – AHA centre is only linked to BNPB – UNOCHA should provide independent/neutral support (but did not)
- How is UN dealing with this emergency on the whole? UN orgs tend to work with one another
- Evaluate national cluster system – they are not neutral – in terms of localization, national cluster system may not be appropriate – e.g. shelter cluster – huntara should be “last option”
- Regarding inclusion, people are living in mountainous area (subject to landslides) – they have relied on timber for livelihoods, increasingly coming to IDP camps – implications for livelihoods
- Red and yellow zones are not always inhabitable – it is right of people to reclaim land – component of advocacy for these people – there is no law regarding mandatory evacuation that can be enforced
- Indonesian gov't has emergency management command system – 2016 #3 – all ministries working in 9 areas: shelter, wash, health, information management etc. agencies who are registered should be in system – in terms of connections between national and provincial, difficult roles are specified in terms of who is responsible, whether UN cluster, or government. System is working in Lombok/NTB, but more ambiguous in Palu – question is what levels of capacities exist to implement such systems
- Are there any NGO only forums in place? (Karen)
- Informal meetings happen within shelter and WASH partners – much history from Aceh, etc.

Discussion of Phase 2 Priorities

1. Cash Transfers

What is needed?

- A lot of registration – required by government, there are people who are illiterate and can't work through banks/financial modalities
- A lot of IDPS through earthquake, liquefaction- many don't have family or id card – lost in disaster, need birth certificates
- Need to bring cash transfer recipients to institutions

- Families – more prioritization & harmonisation among organisations – there is some duplication
- We should be able to talk in the same language about cash transfers
- Guidelines are provided as to amounts in market assessment and cash transfer working groups – but there is no minimum packet (HH expenditure analysis – household basket still needed)
- Government regulations are not also followed 80k + 11k insurance max 30 working days
- Have guidelines on multi-purpose transfers: light, med and heavy damaged houses – max 3 months – under legal review
- Modalities – ongoing MPG, guidelines for shelter grants not yet released by govt – it will happen in March (prior to election)
- At coordination level, it will be through camp system/hub
- Government has agreed to electronic distribution modality, and hard cash in hand should be avoided (however some agencies have done it in early stages)
- Impact of election – need to be very careful, may have to stop distribution of cash transfers during that period, especially hard cash/vouchers – (8 March – 21 April for YSTC is period of suspension- risk mitigation)

2. Livelihoods

Pressing Issues

1. Fishing, 2. Farming, 3. Manufacturing

- Land issues/loss of everything by some households – land, water facilities, access to finances, closure of business, markets affected, negative coping mechanisms, unclear compensation
- Distinction between tenants and ownership – access to rented lands
- Unproductive lands – loss, damaged, unproductive
- Water – lack of irrigation systems for farmers, and insufficient inputs such as seeds, fertilizers
- Fishermen: Boats destroyed, fishing kits missing/destroyed
- Closure of businesses and factories, facilities destroyed and lack of trained labour
- Also lack of demand: markets adversely affected
- These different groups have different needs, including women, youth and people with disabilities
- Negative coping mechanisms might be in place e.g. early marriage, risky livelihoods, child labour
- Many stakeholders at national level, including MoSA, MoWE, Ministry of Manpower, Industries and Trade, Financial conduct authority, Ministry of Cooperatives, Ministry of Labour, Manpower, Etc.
- How to coordinate, at which level, what permissions are needed?

Major constraints

- No common data
- Multiplicity of stakeholders
- No livelihood assessment
- Sub-cluster for Food Security and Livelihoods is not very active (met twice)
- Lack of communication from government on their commitments to livelihoods

Community Engagement Strategies

- Working with existing groups, such as women's and farmers' groups – others might have to be created
- Providing tools, cash, seeds and other in-kind items
- Capacity development
- Develop value chain and marketing strategies
- Incentives for manufacturing industries
- Micro finance activities

Institutional Partners

- Encourage local partner engagement in livelihoods
- Capacity development
- Expertise requirements
- Partnership with other institutions if they don't have expertise
- Timeframe for funding

Action Plan

- Form an informal communication group on WhatsApp
- Conduct joint livelihood assessment

- Share Data among partners
- Stakeholder mapping at many different levels, including donors
- Develop joint proposals
- Advocacy for livelihoods

3. Protection

Group focused on three areas, 1. Older people, 2. PLWD, 3.GBV

Challenges:

1. Lack of accurate data – isn't disaggregated
2. Minimum access for humanitarian support
3. Lack of participation of vulnerable groups in decision-making

How to Engage

- Increased participation of vulnerable groups/provide more space in meetings
- Information to community, govt, orgs
- Training workshops on protection & inclusion
- Promote govt, NGOs and all humanitarian agencies to increase access for vulnerable groups

Needs for Psychosocial Support (PSS)

1. Good shelter management
2. Consultation of beneficiaries in managing the shelter
3. Links to government hospital, health facilities and practitioners

Most Effective Strategies

- Access to govt planning & budgeting
- Recommendations/advocacy to improve accessibility (govt, and other humanitarian actors)
- Provide prototypes of inclusive shelter and latrines
- Encourage vulnerable groups to join planning, monitoring and advocacy
- Inclusion in livelihoods, cash transfers and other programs (mainstreaming)
- Similar issues for children (say YSTC)

WASH

- Wash is one of the biggest clusters in Palu
- Already started in Palu, Sigi, Donggala, but not many agencies involved at related cluster/coordination meetings – led by BAPPEDA at moment
- Many IDPs are in temporary shelters – the water structures alongside are necessary, water trucking is not sustainable on a long-term basis
- Prior to earthquake water committees were working, now they are starting to reengage
- Communities who are affected but remain on their own land is somewhat easier – it is a question of restoring the structures that existed in those communities
- Within Huntara and camp structures, there should be specific people/focal point designated for water and waste management, as well as hygiene– some have been built without so there is low occupancy
- Waste management, there needs to be solid waste intervention, esp. now rainy season
- WASH – hardware under Ministry of Public Works, software under Ministry of Health in budgeting systems – district is budget holder
- PDAM within itself is not capable of meeting the full spectrum of needs
- Irrigation structures need to be restored (national government mandate – cross-cutting with livelihoods)
- NGOs building huntara are encouraged to design with WASH facilities, toilets
- Also, importance of latrines with individual shelters
- Government has not allocated any money for water operation/management within the huntara – matter of time before there are problems, NGO and govt need to work together on that
- Hygiene – govt right now preoccupied with infrastructure (toilets, tanks etc) – needs to accompany any latrine intervention

Shelter

- Early commitments – scale has changed, government interventions have changed, some NGOs are trying to figure out whether there's a place for them in shelter?
- Not all NGOs worked on what they promised – not translated into plan
- Best Approach: Cash plus technical support and oversight

- Still a lot of variations among agencies (could have talked much longer)
- Should be based on SPHERE (and govt) standards, but households should have inputs on house layout and how it works for them, any additional features
- Have to consider cash grant size might be different according to level of damage to previous shelter, etc
- Huntara – yes, there are needs for NGOs to fill in terms of gap
- Various coordination modalities – but lack of clear guidance from govt. on engineering standards there are implications in terms of rollout, costs etc.
- Lots of issues related to land and zoning



Action Points

1. Coordination and Standards Cluster (NGO to NGO)
How to work together among NGOs, strengthen cluster develop joint approach, harmonised delivery
2. Coordination of Laws and Guidelines (NGO-Govt) – clarity on guidelines and rules, permits, cash, land zones, advocate for people and timeliness of response
3. Involvement of Community (NGO to Community) – consultation on design with involved HH, improve capacity of skilled labour, inclusion of vulnerable/invisible


(Discussion of problems in huntara and communal centres – security, privacy, inclusiveness, child beating, drugs, a case of rape...many social issues, is there a role for NGOs to mitigate/prevent? Is there any baseline document? CRS/PMI – technical process is with them. Long house discussion has a history in Indonesia, decision made quickly day 3 or 4 by President – SEKDA and MoWE already asking NGOs (Islamic Relief) to help..comment – can NGOs support decisions already made by government? (huntara)

Annex 9 - Online survey summary report

Total completed responses, 36



Respondents are quite positive about the response they have provided to the crisis. At the same time, survey respondents noted a series of challenges, mostly related to the delay or inadequate response. In some cases, outputs have not been fully achieved and budgets have not been spent. Some organisations consider that they started very quickly and were able to identify the most vulnerable, especially those with local presence or pre-existing local partnerships. Others had difficulty completing due diligence on their new partners, so the response was slower than hoped. There were several comments on delays due to "external constraints". For example, government capacity is seen to be variable and needs strengthening. Some organisations were affected by slow procurement, market assessment and selection of beneficiaries, with an extended relief phase as a result. Local procurement has resulted in slower response.



As with the overall response, respondents are relatively positive about their implementation against the Core Humanitarian Standard. The CHS has been strongly advanced, with in some cases partners putting the principles into action straight away. Several organisations have made progress with robust beneficiary feedback mechanisms and with community engagement and consultation. Needs assessment and verification has been carried out, so that the beneficiaries in need of those receiving help. Staff and local partners have been trained on the prevention of exploitation abuse. It was not always possible to reach the standard indicators for the Sphere standards due to lack of resources and other constraints.

Q6 - Please state any particular good practices or innovations by your organisation in the response.

- Several organisations noted that their investment the CHS, commitment to the localisation agenda clearly capacity development former partners and increasing the proportion of the budget going to local partners.
- Application of information technology
- The interagency Community Engagement and Accountability (CEA) working group as a best practice.
- Ensuring community participation and delivery of relief items in a transparent and responsible way.
- Comprehensive assessments to identify the most vulnerable.
- The Whatsapp group to ensure that people who have been dismissed from the posts because of misconduct are not rehired elsewhere.
- A number of organisations noted their ability to deploying skilled and experienced staff.
- Training on safeguarding and PSEA.
- Use of local volunteers really understand the operating context.
- Working through local faith groups and networks.
- Installing facilities that are tailored to people with disabilities.

Q7 - What are the main challenges you have faced?

Challenges highlighted multiply by respondents include:


- Finding and recruiting capable staff for project implementation.
- Unexpected movement and changing numbers of IDPs.
- Some local partners have very limited capacity to implement projects (while others are highly competent).
- Low capacity of local partners (despite them being confident in their capacity and professionalism).
- UN agencies have offered much higher salaries stand NGOs, thereby drawing away the best staff.
- A small number of local partners and signed contracts with several NGOs at the same time. This took time to sort out.
- Relatively low capacity of local partners means that funds are not used up sufficiently quickly.
- Partners need additional training on CHS, PSU, safeguarding.

- Trying to avoid overlaps with other organisations in an environment with many operational by NGOs and NGOs.
- Poor coordination, especially initially, leading to gaps and overlaps
- Dealing with problematic logistics especially limited availability and late delivery of supplies.
- No pre-identified suppliers or standard kit lists slowed down initial procurement processes.
- Restricted road access due to damaged roads, landslides and blockages, exacerbated by rains
- The Government stopped all imports and tax exemption of relief goods.
- Importing standard items at speed vs. long wait time for local procurement that meet standards/quantities,
- Uncertain government expectations and changes in government requirements
- Government delays and agreeing guidance for cash working group for cash-based support
- Selection of the most vulnerable groups has been time-consuming and intensive, though perceived to have been successful in several cases.
- Managing risk of [political parties] using humanitarian assistance for political campaigns as its election time in the country.
- Trying to meet the needs of parallel challenges due to the three significant disasters and fear of further episodes (earthquakes, flooding etc),
- Donors have not always understood the operating environment
- Slow contracting processes slowing down the partner-led response.
- Senior decision makers in Palu have not always shown capacity or willingness to provide effective leadership for the response.
- Government has limited the access of INGOs and international staff to Palu. This is seen by some to have had a negative capacity on the Quality of the work, even if the principle of localisation is strongly supported.
- Some organisations have had a lack of information and access to coordination structures, which has made their engagement and coordination more difficult and frustrated efforts to bring about the most coherent response between the organisations.
- Unclear regarding the government commitments related to concentrated temporary shelter (HUNTARA) and its relocation compensation, that trigger distrust to government.
- The Huntara, its facilities and social issues that need government and NGO's community's attentions that might be additional works for us to intervene as we couldn't ignore the needs.
- Government regulations restricted international organisations directly delivering aid.
- Limited supply of construction materials since there are many INGOs conducting programs and buying lots of construction materials.
- Unclear and unreliable data which needs regular foundation two double registration.
- Inadequate quality of the water trucks available for hire in the local market
- Some duplication of aid, with rejection from communities not consulted or not wanting what was offered.
- Challenging to ensure that DEC reporting templates are well understood and completed adequately by country staff in the beginning.
- The scale of the emergency was too great the partners and for local authorities; not ready to scale up to meet the magnitude of the challenge.
- Cost of air freight vs time taken for shipping.
- [Difficulty in] Setting up cash transfer programming mechanisms
- Considerable delays in government decisions and approvals (e.g. MPG Guideline, shelter Guideline, disaster zones);
- Lack of coordination between district and provincial government;
- Language issues. Most meetings are in Indonesian
- Getting a clear picture of what the government is really doing vs. what they are actually doing


Q8 - What are the main 2-3 lesson(s) you would draw from the emergency response that can inform the next recovery and reconstruction phase?

- Communities are in dire need of livelihood support because their livelihoods assets have been ruined or degraded.


- There is a need for collective efforts to revive farming and fishing.
- Communities need a comprehensive preparedness and mitigation package.
- For future disasters the government of Indonesia and the Indonesian Red Cross should review their regulations and procedures. Better local anchoring of the response is required.
- Rapid response was only possible where teams were already in place and funds were available.
- With so many NGOs working in similar locations it would be good to invite all interested parties to sit together and coordinate with communities to make sure best use of resources.
- And you should come together and working groups advocate for clear guidance from government ministries.
- Future response only depends on increasing capacity of the Indonesian Red Cross and provincial and district branches. And local government
- More that's what is needed in local capacity to reduce dependence on international staff
- Sub clusters need for strong relations between each other and the government.
- National staff need more support and counselling.
- Partnerships would benefit from stronger assessment of partner capacity, better understanding of mutual expectations, the clearer definition and vision for the partnership.
- In situations where government restricts the actions of foreign personnel, the localisation agenda needs to be advanced still faster.
- NGOs need to be more willing to share information with government.
- Better coordinated response
- There is no need to focus on building resilience community district and provincial levels.
- Livelihoods and shelter are the two main needs for the recovery
- Make sure all the actors are using sex and age disaggregated data.
- Partners need to improve their capacity in reporting and finance systems.
- It is crucial to have a clear picture of what the government is planning to do
- Government systems and structures, in order to interact most effectively with them. (This was not sufficiently well taken into account at the beginning).




Some partners have absorbed the CHS training better than others. 'It is like starting from scratch and you can't guarantee buy-in.' More training is required. It is a continuous process, starting with a minimum and building up.



Respondents rated with their organisations meeting of the sphere standards very highly. However, in comments it was noted that the sphere standards were not always met, especially initially. According to one comment: ‘In the beginning there was a lack of coordination and sometimes agencies promised to provide services and goods, which they did not end up providing.’ In some cases, ‘the bar was set too high’. The Sphere Standards are not always recognised by partners.




Survey respondents provided contrasting responses to this question, for example: “We delivered assistance from day one” and “We could activate the roster within 24 hours and deployed in Day 2” versus “this response has run very slowly compared with other responses globally”. Those partners able to respond quickly have either International or national contingency stocks available, or both. Where partnerships had to first be agreed, there was inevitably some delay in responding.



Government restrictions mean that it has not been possible to implement Health program. Poverty, gender and age all receive specific consideration. More needs to be done on disability. Initially a blanket approach was used targeting, but now the most vulnerable have been identified, partly based on the joint rapid needs assessment. Some organisations consider that they have been successful in addressing the needs in underserved and hard to reach areas.




Again, respondents rated themselves as good other than very good. In contrast with other questions, the comments are even more positive than the craft might suggest. Organisations are very satisfied the level of community and beneficial engagement, how their assessment processes have consulted them. For some NGOs, this is a new experience to have to work so closely with local leaders. Focus groups and music consultations have been widely used.




In the comments to question 17, participants provided varied feedback that matched the range of responses between fair and very good shown on the graph above. Those wider application of


Community feedback and complaints mechanisms, someone from IT driven. However, there is contrasting feedback on the extent to which the complaints mechanisms actually being used. For example, "the complaint mechanisms properly conducted", versus "beneficiary feedback is not followed up systematically", and, "complaint mechanisms are technically in place but often not used". According to others, mechanism is a working progress. The idea of feedback and complaints mechanisms is new to some partners.




Some respondents commented that they have the capacity to deliver the plan project results. Others recognised that they are improving from a slow start, others recognise that some partners are delivering well and others are not. One respondent commented on there being "too many donors for a small project", and "a lack of senior management staff to guide this process".



Comments to this question carry a strong sense of organisations commitment to capacity development of local partners. However very little is said about how this is to be achieved. One organisation cites a dedicated development programme based on an organisation wide approach, while another states that trains better carried out in the field rather than in workshops. Many organisations have organised on all issues but sometimes almost not attend due to pressure of work. One respondent commented that they were yet to see "any real strategic long-term aim to develop capacity of partners".



Respondents noted that corn nation is organised under certain sectors according to sing Indonesian National disaster response framework. Meetings generally take place in Bahasa Indonesia. Curtis has made of social this access to mention. Some sectors have started to putting place Cornish instructions at district level as well as prevention. One respondent reported that: "Many local organizations do not attend coordination meetings or report back where and what they are doing", and another that "Coordination has been much more ad hoc than other responses". A good deal better coordination takes place informally outside cluster meetings. In general, the performance of clusters varies significantly, and respondents agreed that there is room for improvement.



One respondent reported that "The partners have very good relations", another that "cooperation is very good with government officials, although it is still difficult to access districts and provincial government agencies." The shift from provincial to district level for coordination it seen to be a good thing

Q22 - What are the main gaps in the overall response?

Comments on the main gaps in the overall response were:

- Coordination, including: insufficient government capacity to manage coordination processes and to come forward with clear plans of their own, the need for coordination that leads to a complementary approach between agencies
- Lack of land for building, which is delaying the recovery phase.
- Inadequate direction by government and slow decisions on 'no build' land
- Lack of systems for preparedness
- Lack of harmonised data
- Inadequate progress on cash transfers
- Slow and inadequate funding

- Restrictions on INGO expatriate staff coming to Sulawesi (now somewhat relaxed) and lack of INGO direct I implementation
- Direction from National Government
- Mainstreaming age and disability in all activities
- GBV programming

Q23 - What are your organisation's priorities for Phase II recovery and reconstruction?

Frequently cited priorities for Phase II, were:

Most frequent

- Shelter
- Wash
- Livelihoods support and recovery
- Cash based interventions

Several mentions

- Resilience and disaster risk reduction
- Health and psychosocial support
- Protection
- Localisation and capacity building
- Education

Annex 10 - Key Informant Interview Questions

For programme managers of DEC Members/SwS partners

1. (General opening) How well is the response going? What are the main lessons from the implementation process so far?
2. How has your response been affected by the operating environment (e.g. cluster system, restrictions on foreign workers, interruptions to supply chains)? How have you adapted?
3. What if any benefits derive from the funding from the [DEC or SwS]? Does it allow your organisation to take initiatives that other funding sources do not?
4. What is the timeframe for the funding you have received? How does this affect the type of response you can provide?
5. Has the organisation been able to implement the Core Humanitarian Standard? Do you have practical guidance for doing so? How have/ have implementing partners applied the CHS in this response?
6. How has your organisation applied the Sphere standards and related technical standards? Are local partners using these standards? Have benchmarks/targets been adapted/modified for the response?
7. How well have needs been assessed and targeted? Was this done in a timely way? How accurate is the data? Has it been possible to identify and reach the most vulnerable?
8. How are you addressing the different impacts of 1) earthquake, 2) tsunami and 3) liquefaction?
9. Has your organisation undertaken/been part of a market assessment? Are there shortages in supplies, materials, medicines? What steps have been taken to address shortages?
10. How does your organisation hear and address complaints from beneficiaries?
11. Are there gaps in the collective response (sectoral or geographic)?
12. How is your organisation addressing the different needs of male and female beneficiaries?
13. What kinds of protection services is your organisation providing, if any? What specific steps have been taken to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian workers?
14. What is the capacity of your partners to respond to the crisis? How has your organisation been building the capacity of local partners?
15. Is your organisation seeking to influence the government or UN management and coordination of the response? If so, how?
16. What are your plans for Phase 2? What are the coming risks and needs? What challenges need to be addressed to make Phase 2 a success?

Questions for Field Staff (DEC/SwS or implementing partners)

1. What are the main challenges faced by people affected by the disaster at the moment?
2. What are the chances of people being able to go home or to be relocated to new areas?
3. What are the standards you are required to apply to your work? Where do they come from?
4. If the communities/people affected are not satisfied with the help they are receiving, how can they be heard and their problems resolved?
5. What challenges do you face in implementing the planned programme?
6. How is the situation changing? How will your organisation need to change its approach over the coming months?
7. Are there gaps in the collective response (sectoral or geographic)?

Questions for Focus Groups

1. What are the main challenges you face right now?
2. How is the community looking after its members?

3. Are the most vulnerable people getting the special help they need (elderly, children, sick)?
4. How safe do people feel? What are the main risks and dangers people face?
5. What kinds of help have you received?
6. What has been most and least helpful? Where / who does the help come from?
7. Is there financial help?
8. What are the main needs for the next few months?

For Donors

1. What are your observations about how well [DEC Members/SwS partners as appropriate] are supporting the disaster response in Sulawesi?
2. How is your Government working with the Gol to make sure INGOs can make a meaningful contribution?
3. Would it be useful for INGOs to take a fuller part in coordination and planning of the response? If so, how can this happen?
4. What are the future funding prospects for the rehabilitation phase?
5. What are your priorities for Phase 2?
6. What are the coming risks and needs? What challenges need to be addressed to make Phase 2 a success?

For the UN or other third-party international organisations

1. How has the response been influenced by the operating context and the specific management and coordination arrangements in place for this response?
2. How is the response overall adjusting to the relative lack of funding? Are there sufficient alternative sources to HCT/IFRC/ other appeals?
3. Does the funding from the DEC and Swiss Solidarity make a distinctive contribution? Has it allowed the organisations to respond in ways that other funding sources do not?
4. Was the response of INGOs timely compared with other national and international organisations?
5. How well integrated are INGOs into the response as a whole?
6. What are the main gaps in the capacity of the local implementing partners (if any)? How can these gaps best be addressed?
7. Would it be useful for INGOs to take a fuller part in coordination and planning of the response? If so, how can this happen?
8. What are the coming risks and needs? What challenges need to be addressed to make Phase 2 a success?

Annex 11 - DEC Members & Swiss Solidarity Partners – Local Delivery Partners

DEC Members	Swiss Solidarity Partners	Delivery Partner	DEC &/or Swiss Solidarity	DEC funds via	Alliance
Action Against Hunger		Aquassistance	DEC		
Action Against Hunger	CBM Switzerland & Swiss Church Aid EPER/HEKS	YAKKUM	Both		ACT Alliance
ActionAid		Sikola Mombine	DEC	via YAPPIKA(ActionAid)	
ActionAid		Solidaritas Perempuan	DEC	via YAPPIKA(ActionAid)	
ActionAid		WALHI Sulawesi Tengah	DEC	via YAPPIKA(ActionAid)	
Age International	ADRA Switzerland	Adventist Development and Relief Agency	Both		
Age International		HelpAge International	DEC		
Age International	CBM Switzerland & Swiss Church Aid EPER/HEKS	YAKKUM	DEC		ACT Alliance
British Red Cross		IFRC	DEC		
British Red Cross	Swiss Red Cross	Palang Merah Indonesia	Both		RC RC
CAFOD		Catholic Relief Services	DEC		
CAFOD		Karina (Caritas Indonesia)	Both		
CAFOD		Muhammadiyah Disaster Management Centre	DEC		
CARE International UK		PKPU Human Initiative	DEC		
Christian Aid	CBM Switzerland & Swiss Church Aid EPER/HEKS	YAKKUM	DEC		ACT Alliance
Islamic Relief		PKPU Human Initiative	DEC		
Oxfam GB		Jejaring Mitra Kemanusiaan	DEC		
Oxfam GB		LBH Apik coalition (includ. the Palu & the Makassar unit)	DEC		
Oxfam GB		PKBI coalition (includ. the Palu & the Makassar unit)	DEC		

Plan International UK		Rebana	DEC	via Yayasan Plan Indonesia (Plan)	
Plan International UK		Yayasan Plan Indonesia	DEC		
Save the Children	Save the Children Switzerland	Save the Children Indonesia	Both		
Tearfund		World Renew	DEC		
Tearfund	Medair	Yayasan Bumi Tangguh	Both		
Tearfund		Yayasan Fondasi Hidup Indonesia	DEC		
World Vision		Wahana Visi Indonesia	DEC		
	Solidar Switzerland	Arbeiter Samariter Bund	Swiss Solidarity		Solidar network
	Medair	Cipta Fondasi Komunitas Indonesia	Swiss Solidarity		Integral Alliance
	Caritas Suisse	IBU foundation	Swiss Solidarity		
	Medair	Yayasan Menara Agung Pengharapan Indonesia	Swiss Solidarity		Integral Alliance
	HEKS	Arbeiter Samariter Bund	Swiss Solidarity		Solidar network

mutal partner

SS partner not shared

Annex 12 - Environmental Considerations

According to the World Wildlife Fund,⁹¹ the island of Sulawesi is one of the “Global 200” most outstanding areas for biodiversity, based on its remarkable diversity of terrestrial flora and fauna, endemic mammal (72) and bird (1,450) species and rich coastal marine life. Sulawesi is surrounded by rich seas with large habitats of seagrass and coral reefs. These habitats are home to leatherback, hawksbill, and green sea turtles, as well as dugongs and six of the world's seven giant clam species. Whales that use the waters as a by-way include sperm whales, pygmy sperm whales, and killer whales.⁹² There is a proliferation of fish species surrounding the island, which gives rise to livelihoods.

Despite its biodiversity status, the lowland dry forests (areas at less than 1,000 meters altitude) are “completely gone” due to large scale agricultural plantations, transmigration, logging and local clearance. In the upland areas (above 1,000 meters) of montane forests, more than half the original forests have been cleared (primarily due to commercial logging, much of it illegal, and land encroachment) and the remaining forests have been heavily fragmented. The district of Sigi would be an example of the latter. Slash and burn agriculture is still practiced in some areas.

With an annual value approaching \$4.0 billion in 2017,⁹³ Indonesia has become the second-largest producer of fish, crustaceans and aquatic plants globally by volume, after China, due in part to a boom in aquaculture production dominated by seaweed. Maritime and fisheries policies have been a central priority for the Indonesian government since 2014 when President Widodo was elected, under the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries. The Indonesian government has taken significant measures to combat illegal fishing and a permanent moratorium on fishing by ex-foreign vessels operating within the exclusive economic zone and a ban on transshipment at sea were adopted in 2014.⁹⁴ Illegal operations accounted for about 30% of revenues. However, the regulatory environment for small boats is complex.

The fishing industry in Indonesia employs nearly 20 million people, primarily from poor and remote areas. Fish provides an important source of relatively low-cost protein in areas where malnutrition is relatively common and is rich in essential fatty acids, and micronutrients, such as Vitamins A, B and D and iodine. According to the Ministry, the average fish consumption per person in 2015 was 41.11 kg. This would likely be characteristic of the areas affected by the earthquake, tsunami and liquefaction. At the time the Rapid Review was conducted, the results of the Post Disaster Needs Assessment conducted by various UN agencies and the GoI were not yet available, so there were no related data about the livelihood profiles of survivors. However, fishing is visibly a major occupation in coastal tsunami-affected zones and much of the related infrastructure (boats, motors, wharfs, nets, etc.) were demolished, halting activity.

In Indonesia, commercial overfishing, particularly of shrimp and tuna, and destructive practices, such as the use of explosives, sedatives, trawling, poor waste disposal and other pollutants, have had serious environmental impacts, including threatening and destroying mangroves and coral reefs and depleting stocks. Some importing countries have rejected some Indonesian fishery products as unacceptable in quality over recent years. Despite this, 90% of fishermen operate small boats, and sell primarily to the domestic market. This tends to be a labour-intensive, seasonal occupation, with low value chains, a frequent dependency on middle men/traders and limited human resource capacity, in comparison to the commercial ventures. The occupation has yet been further stressed by the depletion of stocks. A small-scale fisheries act (National Act No 7/2016 for the Protection and Empowerment, of Fishermen, Fish Raisers and Salt Farmers⁹⁵) was intended to provide support for the infrastructure and means of practicing sustainable businesses capacity building, institutional arrangements, financing system, risks transfer, and legal assistance. The current status of any related project implementation in Central Sulawesi was beyond the scope of this review.

⁹¹ <https://www.worldwildlife.org/ecoregions/aa0123>

⁹² Charles H. Cannon, Marcy Summers, John R. Harting, and Paul J.A. Kessler (2007). "Developing Conservation Priorities Based on Forest Type, Condition, and Threats in a Poorly Known Ecoregion: Sulawesi, Indonesia". Biotropica online 25 May to June 25, 2007.

⁹³ California Environmental Associates. 2018. "Trends in Marine Resources and Fisheries Management in Indonesia: A 2018 Review"

⁹⁴ [http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=TAD/FI\(2017\)14/FINAL&docLanguage=En](http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=TAD/FI(2017)14/FINAL&docLanguage=En)

⁹⁵ <http://extwprlegs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/ins159362.pdf>

Annex 13 – Terms of Reference

Introduction

The Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) brings together fourteen of the largest UK humanitarian charities to raise funds in response to major humanitarian crises overseas. Swiss Solidarity (SwS) raises donations in collaboration with the Public Broadcaster and private media in Switzerland and funds humanitarian projects of its 25 Swiss partner NGOs. In order to support members' and partners' activities, harness lessons and inform Phase II of the activities funded by DEC and by SwS, the DEC will commission a Response Review of the members' and partners' response with an in-country learning workshop to be held **by end of January 2019** and a report due to DEC **by February 2019**. While specific timelines will be agreed in due course, findings and recommendations need to inform the preparation of DEC members' and SwS partners' Phase II Plans.

Background

Several earthquakes struck Central Sulawesi in Indonesia on 28 September 2018, with the strongest at a depth of 10km and a magnitude of 7.4 on the Richter Scale. A tsunami alert was triggered, then lifted, before high-speed waves as high as 6 metres reportedly hit Palu, Donggala and Mamuju, leaving a trail of destruction behind them. More than 2,000 people died, whilst 191,000 are identified as being in need of urgent humanitarian assistance under the Response Plan (Oct – Dec 2018) published by the Humanitarian Country team on 5 October 2018.

On 4 October 2018, the DEC launched an appeal for funds to support member agencies in responding to the extensive humanitarian needs in Central Sulawesi. All fourteen DEC members are supporting the fundraising appeal, with thirteen⁹⁶ having national affiliates and local partners in Indonesia, thus drawing down appeal funds to implement relief, recovery and reconstruction activities. Expected programme duration is two years, with activities split into Phase I (the first six months) and Phase II (the following 18 months). DEC members have budgeted to spend £6.5 million on emergency relief and early recovery activities before end March 2019.

SwS held an appeal day on 6 October 2018. By the end of October SFr 10.5 million (£8 million) had been raised. Eight Swiss partners⁹⁷ are supporting their local partners or affiliates in the implementation of relief and early recovery activities. Up to SFr 4 million will be allocated for a first phase of five months, followed by recovery and reconstruction activities starting from February 2019.

DEC members and Swiss Solidarity partners are working through common national and local delivery partners.

Purpose of Response Review

The primary purpose of the Response Review is to instigate and promote learning from the initial phase of the response across the DEC members and SwS partners, in order that lessons be applied in real-time, and integrated into Phase II plans. Both the DEC and SwS are committed to the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS)⁹⁸, with commitment 7 - "humanitarian actors continuously learn and improve" - being demonstrated through the Response Review process.

The Response Review will:

- draw out key lessons, at operational level, that can be utilised in the design and implementation of Phase II Plans;
- highlight good practice in the humanitarian operations funded by the DEC and SwS;
- where relevant, identify gaps, areas of unmet need and challenges to the humanitarian operations funded by the DEC and SwS, from both a sector-specific and cross-cutting perspective.

The Response Review will focus on specific areas of enquiry that will be determined through close consultation with members during the inception phase. At a minimum, it is expected that it will focus on: how DEC members and SwS partners are addressing the needs of the most vulnerable groups; how they ensure accountability to affected populations through the application of the Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS) and related guidelines on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA); and how they are working with and through local partners and engaging with national authorities in this response.

Whilst a Response Review report will be produced and made available in the public domain, the primary audience, and intended users, of this Response Review are the member agency staff responsible for

⁹⁶ Action Against Hunger, ActionAid, Age International, British Red Cross, CAFOD, CARE International, Christian Aid, Concern Worldwide, Islamic Relief, Oxfam, Plan International, Save the Children, Tearfund and World Vision.

⁹⁷ ADRA Switzerland; Caritas Suisse; Swiss Red Cross; Medair; Save the Children Switzerland; Solidar Switzerland; Swiss Church Aid EPER/HEKS; CBM Christoffel Blindenmission Switzerland

⁹⁸ <https://corehumanitarianstandard.org/the-standard>

planning and managing the programmes in Phase II. The substantial learning will be realised through the in-country process undertaken by the Review Team, rather than relying on the end-product. Therefore, it is crucial that the appropriate staff from each member agency are effectively engaged from the outset.

Roles and responsibilities

The Response Review consultants:

The Review Team will be led by a Team Leader, who will be responsible for:

- leading on all aspects of the Response Review and coordinating the Review Team;
 - pro-actively contributing to the identification of key areas of enquiry in consultation with members and partners;
- designing the Response Review methodology and data collection tools;
- leading on quality assurance, data analysis, drawing conclusions and learning points, developing recommendations;
- designing the session plans and facilitating the in-country workshops;
 - drafting the written deliverables (see section 7 below), and sharing these with the DEC Secretariat for feedback and comment using DEC's feedback template;
 - delivering a presentation of draft findings, conclusions and recommendations at debriefing meetings with DEC members in London and with SwS partners in Berne;
 - travel arrangements for the consultants – including all related visas, flights and insurance (unless agreed otherwise);
- liaising with the DEC Secretariat;
- liaising with the host member agency in the field.

The DEC Secretariat:

As the commissioning agent of the Response Review, the DEC Secretariat will:

- provide a staff member to accompany the Review Team during in-country data collection;
- organise for a DEC member agency to host the Review Team during their visit to Sulawesi;
- host an inception meeting and a debriefing session with the consultants and DEC members in London, with provision for in-country colleagues to participate;
- arrange the DEC Secretariat staff member's travel arrangements, including related visas and insurance;
- provide all necessary documentation to the Review Team, including: contact information for member agencies and their operational partners in UK and in-country; members' programme plans and budgets;
- coordinate members' and partners' feedback to the initial draft of the Response Review report;
- disseminate and publish the final Response Review report;
- liaise with the host member agency in the field.

Swiss Solidarity:

SwS will contribute to processes listed above, with the DEC holding communication with the consultant team.

DEC members and SwS partners:

All DEC members and SwS partners (responding for this appeal) will fully engage with the Response Review throughout the entire process from ToR stage to final report, ensuring that the work funded by the DEC and SwS is transparent and accessible for the Review Team. Specifically, they will:

- provide any pre-existing MEL outputs or learning of their own that would be relevant for desk review or synthesis in advance of the inception workshop;
- provide (to the DEC Secretariat or the SwS office, respectively) details of a designated in-country contact to facilitate communication around the plans for the Response Review, including logistics and project visits;
- organise site visits and focus groups;
- provide details of proposed key informants – within their organisation and externally;
- engage in interviews with the Review Team where appropriate;
- provide representation of the appropriate level at all workshops from inception phase onwards – both in-country and in London or Berne;

- facilitate engagement with implementing partners where appropriate.

DEC host member:

The host member agency will support the Review Team during their mission to Sulawesi. During the course of the Response Review, they will:

- liaise with a designated member of the Review Team;
- facilitate visits to their own and other agencies' project locations for data collection purposes;
- support with organising of in-country workshops with DEC members, SwS partners, and their local partners at the start and end of the field work;
- provide or facilitate access to other logistical support such as transport and workshop venue (significant expenditure will be reimbursed).

Specific details on the level of support required and the roles and responsibilities will be agreed in the form of a Hosting Agreement during the inception phase.

Response Review questions

The process for establishing areas of enquiry will be fully consultative in the form of a participatory workshop with key stakeholders of the Response Review (including both HQ and in-country colleagues). The consultant will lead the workshop and propose an approach, which will then be agreed in consultation with the DEC Secretariat. Following this workshop, an inception report containing a succinct set of draft questions, will be produced. The questions will be designed to:

- draw out key lessons, at operational level, that can be utilised in the design and implementation of DEC and SwS Phase II Plans;
- highlight good practice in the humanitarian operations funded by the DEC and SwS;
- where relevant identify gaps, areas of unmet needs, and challenges to the humanitarian operations funded by the DEC and SwS, from both a sector-specific and cross-cutting perspective.

Methodology

The team will use multiple methods to triangulate their findings and ensure that these are based on a good understanding of the current context. The methods applied will be light, rapid and participatory. Secondary desk review will cover DEC members' and SwS partners' programme plans and learning outputs (if any) by December in order to inform the facilitation of the inception workshop and the drafting of the inception report. This element of the Response Review will be used to inform the fine tuning of the areas of enquiry and the evaluation questions; the consultants are not expected to undertake any detailed analysis of plans or any monitoring data if this is available ahead of the Response Review.

In-country primary data collection will involve visiting member agencies, implementing partners, project sites, and affected communities, as well as other external stakeholders identified during inception phase and throughout the process.

Review Team

The Review Team will be gender-balanced and consist of a minimum of two consultants who can demonstrate the following:

- extensive experience in real-time reviews of humanitarian programmes is a must;
- strong experience with a variety of evaluation methodologies applied in a humanitarian context and involving disaster-affected populations;
- a sound understanding of the context in Indonesia;
- expertise in one or more of the relevant technical areas / sectors in this response;
- a good understanding of the DEC and its DEC Accountability Framework (DECAF);
- a sound knowledge of Humanitarian Principles; the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief; the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability; and Sphere Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response, as well as an appreciation of key challenges and constraints to their application in the relevant context;
- strong facilitation skills and experience in designing highly-participatory learning workshops;
- demonstrable analytical, communication and report-writing skills (in English);
- 7 demonstrable commitment to learning and improvement in humanitarian action.

Experience of working in Indonesia and knowledge of relevant languages within the team is desirable. Experience with DEC or DEC members, SwS or SwS partners is a plus.

Note that both a DEC staff member and a SwS staff member will accompany the consultants during the field visit and contribute to in-country briefing and de-briefing activities. DEC may also seek further support from the membership if it is necessary to add to the team someone with a specific area of expertise.

Deliverables and Schedule

The consultants are expected to work to the following, with specific timeframes to be agreed with the DEC:

Preliminary meeting with DEC and Swiss Solidarity.

The preliminary meeting will be an opportunity to: review the consultant's proposal and any final questions arising; discuss any appeal-specific issues not already addressed; agree roles and responsibilities; explore plans for logistics and hosting arrangements etc.

Inception workshop with members.

The consultant/s will design and facilitate a half-day participatory inception workshop to present their initial thoughts following desk review, and to consult with DEC members and SwS partners on areas of enquiry. To include both HQ and in-country colleagues (remotely).

Inception report submitted to DEC by consultants.

Informed by the inception workshop, an inception report will be produced to include the following:

- specific areas of enquiry;
- a comprehensive matrix of review questions;
- a detailed methodology;
- a detailed work plan and timeline;
- proposed structure for final report.

In-country briefing workshop.

The consultant/s will design and facilitate a half-day briefing workshop with DEC members and Swiss Solidarity partners and their local counterparts to kick-off the Response Review in-country. This workshop should clarify the objectives and explore process for the review. A schedule and logistical arrangements should also be finalised in this workshop.

In-country learning workshop.

The consultant/s will design and facilitate a half/full-day participatory learning session for DEC members, SwS partners and their implementing partners. Whilst it will cover preliminary findings and conclusions, it will also allow ample space for raising of validation issues, and joint exploration of potential scenarios and recommendations.

London and Bern debriefing meetings.

The consultant will provide a presentation and discuss findings and recommendations with DEC members and SwS partners.

Response Review report

The consultants will produce a Response Review report as follows:

- confined to the specific objectives of the Response Review;
- submitted in Word format, Arial 11, in English;
- a maximum of 20 pages (excluding an executive summary and appendices);
- include a glossary of abbreviations and terms;
 - present recommendations⁷ based on empirical evidence gathered during the course of the mission, prioritised and limited to 10 key points;
 - include appropriate appendices providing commentary or case studies of individual agencies' performance or good practice where appropriate;
 - stay focused on the objectives and avoid generalisations or speculation as to the possible role of the DEC or SwS in current or future emergencies.⁸

⁸ If other issues do arise, prompt discussion with the DEC Secretariat will determine how they should be addressed.

It is important to note, that the report is not a commentary on the overall relief effort, but a timely snapshot of the efforts and behaviours of DEC members, SwS partners and their national and local counterparts.

The Response Review findings will be those of the authors and will be made available to the members as such. Any communication on the findings will make it clear that the report reflects the opinions of the authors alone and not those of the DEC, SwS or its members or partners. The report should acknowledge that the Response Review has been funded by DEC and SwS. It is intended that the report will be made available on the DEC, SwS and ALNAP websites. The DEC may also organise a public launch of the report in UK if there is sufficient interest.

The timeframe and process for the report sign-off (including review and feedback on draft report) will be finalised during the inception phase.

Budget

When calculating the overall budget for this work, the bidder should include (as a minimum) information on the following:

- number of persons as part of the team as well as their daily fee rates;
- approximate number of days for in-country activities;
 - approximate number of days for preparation, inception work and report writing;
 - one day each for inception and debriefing meetings in London and debriefing meeting in Berne including airfare;
- economy class flights to and from a suitable airport in Sulawesi;
 - estimated costs for modest but safe accommodation and in-country travel costs;
 - which will be reimbursed on delivery of invoice (unless separately provided by a DEC member and charged directly to the DEC);
- estimated other costs incurred on field trips.

A maximum total budget for the overall delivery must be stated and will then be considered alongside the technical proposal. The budget cannot exceed £50,000.



Disclaimer

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